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Abstract There are many valid arguments both for and against the use of elec-
tronic voting in real world elections.
My thesis is that a verification-centric software implementation of a particular
algorithm for counting of ballots can be proven correct or shown to be incorrect by
a combination of formal specification, static analysis and testing. Hand counting of
paper ballots might no longer be necessary, if we can assume that the digital ballots
are valid, untampered with and a true representation of the paper ballots etc.
As a case study, the Danish and Irish voting schemes are analyzed in this dis-
sertation, including a discussion of how to generate test cases for the Irish voting
scheme.




In a democratic society, the will of the people is expressed either directly through
referenda or indirectly through the election of public representatives and other pub-
lic officials.
1.1.1 The Secret Ballot
To avoid coercion or intimidation of voters it is common practice to require that
ballots remain secret, so that an individual voter cannot reveal how he or she voted.
The use of printed paper ballots instead of handwritten votes to preserve se-
crecy is sometimes known as the Australian Ballot [29, 35].
However the integrity of a paper ballot still depends on physical security con-
trols. Historically, failed security controls have led to modified, spoiled, and stolen
ballots, as well as to stuffed ballot boxes [9].
There is also a potential for mistakes in the manual process of counting paper
3
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ballots by hand. Goggin and Bryne have observed that there can be up to two
percent inaccuracy [34, 33].
1.1.2 Electronic Voting Machines
There are many good arguments in favor of electronic voting. It avoids the chain-
of-custody problems of handling physical ballot papers and the human error as-
sociated with manual counting. It also defeats the problem of ballot papers being
stolen or false ballot papers added, so-called ballot stuffing [67].
Many countries have used electronic voting with apparent success, others have
failed completely and some have continuing problems [36, 48, 60, 26, 50]
Voting and Elections in Ireland
Electronic voting machines are no longer used in the Republic of Ireland, for ex-
ample. The decision to stop using e-voting was based on several different factors,
including an inability to verify the accuracy of the proprietary vote counting soft-
ware [37, 22, 51].
1.1.3 Internet Voting
Remote voting through the Internet provides convenience and access to the elec-
torate. At the same time, the security concerns facing any distributed application
are magnified when the task is so crucial to democratic society. In addition, some
of the electoral process loses transparency when it is encapsulated in information
technology [66, 42, 61].
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Man in the Middle (MITM) attack
Internet voting is also vulnerable to the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, in
which the attacker impersonates the client machine to the server and the server
machine to the client. This might be avoided, for example, by physical distribution
of the cryptographic certificates to each voter [56, 27, 7].
1.1.4 Cryptographic Voting
Various researchers have suggested cryptographic schemes for secure electronic
voting [43, 10, 4, 64]. These technologies are complementary to, but outside the
scope of my dissertation.
Sandler, Derr and Wallach have proposed a solution called VoteBox, that pro-
vides strong end-to-end security guarantees without use of a paper audit trail but
instead using a concept called the Auditorium which
joins all voting machines together all election events are signed and
broadcast each broadcast is logged by every machine
and timestamps are connected using hash-chaining[65].
In contrast, my dissertation uses the Irish and Danish voting schemes as a case
study. For the purpose of my dissertation, I simply assume that there exists a
suitable technology similar to the Auditorium in VoteBox.
1.2 Motivation
Accidentally or maliciously altering a small number of votes can alter the outcome
of an election. Every vote needs to be counted. This means that even a very
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small error can have wide ranging consequences, undermining confidence in the
democratic process and weakening the moral authority of elected leaders [59].
1.3 Thesis Statement
The following is the core statement of my thesis:
A verification-centric software implementation of a particular algorithm for
counting of ballots can be proven correct or shown to be incorrect by a combination
of formal specification, static analysis and testing. Hand counting of paper ballots
might no longer be necessary, if we can assume that the digital ballots are valid,
untampered with and a true representation of the paper ballots.
In other words, we might not always need a voter verifiable paper audit trail
(VVPAT), to verify the counting, although it might be needed for other reasons
e.g. to verify the collection of votes; and that the votes cast are the same as those
counted, but not to verify the actual count itself. The VVPAT might be needed for
matching up and verifying the authenticity of the ballots, but not for verification of
the counting. The auditors should be able to choose an electronic ballot at random,
and match it to a paper ballot in the audit trail, but there is no need to count the
audit trail by hand [70,
Chapter 2
Formalisation of Electoral Law
A voting scheme is an algorithm for counting of ballots. A preference voting
scheme allows the voter to rank two or more candidates (C) in order of prefer-
ence from first to last. In contrast, a plurality voting scheme requires the voter to
pick one candidate, and thus is equivalent to the preference scheme when only the
first preference is used.
2.1 Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV)
Definition 1 (Spoilt Ballot) A ballot is spoilt if it contains no valid preferences. A
paper ballot can also be spoilt if it contains writing that could identify the person
casting the vote1.
1However, in practice, where the difference between two candidates is very small, ballots initially
discarded can be looked at again (often with representatives and even lawyers for each candidate
present!). If there is agreement that the intention is clear, even if the ballot paper is strictly invalid,
then it may be accepted. So for example, if the name of one candidate is underlined, and no mark
against any other name and no numeric preference shown, that might be regarded as an effective No
1 vote. Also an X or a tick against one name only is usually accepted as a No 1 vote. This scenario
was not included in my model of PR-STV
7
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Definition 2 (Quota) The quota of ballots for election is calculated so that at most
N candidates can reach the quota, where N is the number of seats in the con-
stituency. The formula for the Droop Quota is 1 + V/(N + 1), where V is the
number of unspoiled ballots cast.
Definition 3 (Surplus) The surplus for a candidate is the number of votes in ex-
cess of the quota. Surplus ballots may be transfered to other candidates.
Definition 4 (Exclusion) The continuing candidate with least votes is eligible for
exclusion; his or her ballots are then available for re-distribution to other contin-
uing candidates.
Definition 5 (Continuing Candidate) A continuing candidate is a candidate who
has not yet been either elected or eliminated.
Definition 6 (Wasted Vote) A ballot with an incomplete set of preferences be-
comes wasted, if and when it is assigned to an excluded candidate or within the
surplus of an elected candidate, and cannot be transferred to any of the continuing
candidates.
Filling of Last Seat When there is one seat remaining and two continuing can-
didates, then the candidate with the greater number of votes is deemed elected
without reaching the quota.
Variants of PR-STV To highlight the complexities of election schemes, con-
sider the following variants of the voting scheme. For example, Australia, Ireland,
Malta, Scotland, and Massachusetts use different variants of PR-STV for their elec-
tions [6].
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• Australia - Australia uses a single-seat variant of PR-STV to elect its House
of Representatives and an open list system for its Senate, where voters can
choose either to vote for individual candidates using PR-STV or to vote
“above-the-line” for a party. If voters choose to use PR-STV then all avail-
able preferences must be used [28].
• Ireland - Ireland uses PR-STV for local, national and European elections.
Transfers are rounded to the nearest whole ballot, so the order in which bal-
lots are transferred makes a difference to the result [54]. Not all preferences
need to be used, so voters may choose to use only one preference, as in
Plurality voting, if desired.
• Malta - Malta uses PR-STV for local, national and European elections. For
national elections Malta also adds additional members so that the party with
the most first preference votes is guaranteed a majority of seats.
• Scotland, UK - Scotland uses PR-STV for local elections. Rather than se-
lect which ballots to include in the surplus, fractions of each ballot are trans-
ferred [32].
• Massachusetts, USA - Cambridge in Massachusetts uses PR-STV for city
elections. Candidates with less than fifty votes are excluded in the first round
and surplus ballots are chosen randomly, rather than in proportion to second
and subsequent preferences.
The fact that a single complex voting scheme like PR-STV has this many vari-
ants in use highlights the challenges in reasoning about and validating a given
software implementation.
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2.2 Abstract Model
In this case study, the core concepts of ballot counting are modeled, for example:
ballots, ballot boxes, candidates, and election results.
Candidates Candidates are identified by (distinct) names. The set of all candi-
dates is denoted C. These examples use canonical candidate names, e.g. Alice,
Bob, etc., like those used in cryptographic protocol analysis.
Ballot An ordinal or preference ballot b is a strict total order on a set of candidates
C. The length of a ballot, |b|, is the number of preferences expressed. The minimum
number of preferences is one, except in systems like that used in Australia where
all preferences must be used. In a plurality voting scheme the maximum number
of preferences is one, otherwise the maximum length of a ballot is the number of
candidates in the election, or at fixed limit determined by electoral law.
2.3 Irish Electoral Law
Article 16, section 2, subsection 5 of the Irish Constitution2 states only that:
The members shall be elected on the system of proportional represen-
tation by means of the single transferable vote.
This leaves considerable freedom for the electoral regulations to define the
precise means of vote casting and counting in the official Commentary on Count
Rules [23, 21].
2http://www.constitution.ie/constitution-of-ireland/default.asp
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The functional requirements were read from the electoral legislation and CEV
guidelines and listed in a table by Cochran and Kiniry [14, 46] e.g.
• Counting does not begin until all votes are loaded.
• The total number of first preference votes must remain the same after each
count.
• The (Droop) quota is equal to ((Number of valid votes cast)/(Number of seats
being filled + 1)) + 1, ignoring any remainder.
• Any candidate with a quota or more than a quota of votes, is deemed to be
elected.
• The surplus for an elected candidate is the difference between the quota and
his/her total number of votes.
• The minimum number of votes required for a candidate to secure the return
of his/her deposit is one plus one-quarter of a quota based on the total number
of seats in the constituency.
2.4 Mechanics of PR-STV
To give context, we now discuss the mechanics of PR-STV in more detail.
Preference Ballots The voter writes the number “1” beside his or her favorite
candidate. There can only be one first preference.
The voter then considers which candidate would be his or her next preference
if his or her favorite candidate is either excluded from the election or is elected
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with a surplus of votes.
The second preference is marked with “2” or some equivalent notation. There
can be only one second preference; there cannot be a joint second preference3.
Likewise for third and subsequent preferences. Not all preferences need to be
used, but there should be no gaps in the rank order e.g. there cannot be a fourth
preference without a third preference.
Multi-seat constituencies Each electoral constituency in Da´il E´ireann , the
lower house of the Irish state legislature, is represented by either three, four or
five members.
Definition 7 (The Droop Quota) The quota is calculated so that not all candi-
dates can reach the quota. The Droop Quota is ! V1+S ", where V is the total number
of valid votes cast and S is the number of vacancies (or seats) to be filled [30]. The
quota is chosen so that any candidate reaching the quota is automatically elected,
and so that the number of candidates with a quota is less than or equal to the
number of seats.
For example, in a five-seat constituency a candidate needs just over one-sixth
of the total vote to be assured of election.
Definition 8 (Surplus) The surplus for each candidate, is the number of ballots in
excess of the quota (if any). The surplus ballots are then available for redistribution
to other continuing candidates.
The selection of which ballots belong to the surplus is a complex issue, depend-
ing on the round of counting. In the first round of counting, any surplus is divided
3This is because a physical ballot paper is not intended to be split in two, but in a digital voting
system with fractional ballots it would be possible to have equality of preferences
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into sub-piles for each second preference, so that the distribution of the ballots in
the surplus is proportional to the second-preferences. In later rounds the surplus
is taken from the last parcel of ballots received from other candidates. This surplus
is then sorted into sub-piles according to the next available preference.
For example, if the quota is 9,000 votes and candidate A receives 10,000 first
preference votes, then the surplus is 1,000 votes. Suppose 5,000 ballots had can-
didate B as next preference, 3,000 had candidate C and 2,000 had candidate D.
Then the surplus consists of 500 ballots taken from the 5,000 for candidate B, 300
from the 3,000 for candidate C and 200 from the 2,000 for candidate D4.
Exclusion of weakest candidates When there are more candidates than available
seats, and all surplus votes have been distributed, the continuing candidate with
least votes is excluded.
All ballots from the pile of the excluded candidate are then transferred to the
next preference for a continuing candidate, or to the pile of non-transferable votes.
This continues until another candidate is elected with a surplus or until the
number of continuing candidates equals the number of remaining seats.
Filling of Last Seat and Bye-elections When there is only one seat remaining
to be filled, i.e. the number of candidates having so far reached the quota is one
less than the number of seats, or in a bye-election for a single vacancy, then the
algorithm becomes the same as Instant Runoff Voting; no more surplus distributions
are possible, and candidates with least votes are excluded until only two remain.
4Ideally each subset would also be sorted according to third and subsequent preferences, but
this does not happen under the current procedure for counting by hand, nor was it mandated in the
previous guidelines for electronic voting in Ireland
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Last Two Continuing Candidates When there are two continuing candidates
and one remaining seat, then the algorithm becomes the same as single-winner
First Past The Post (FPTP) plurality; the candidate with more votes is deemed
elected to the remaining seat, without needing to reach the quota.
In the next chapter I will discuss some of the various technologies that can
be used in verification, and then in chapter 4, I will discuss existing examples of




This chapter describes and compares an assortment of verification technologies.
3.1 Java Modeling Language
The Java Modeling Language (JML) is a behavioral interface specification lan-
guage that can be used to specify the behavior of Java modules. It combines the
design by contract approach of Eiffel and the model-based specification approach
of the Larch family of interface specification languages, with some elements of the
refinement calculus [8, 13].
3.2 Extended Static Checking
Extended Static Checking (ESC) is the transformation of a program into a set of
verification conditions, which can then be checked using an automated theorem
prover.
15
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ESC/Java2 is a programming tool that attempts to partially verify JML anno-
tated Java programs by static analysis of the program code and its formal annota-
tions. It translates the specifications into verification conditions that are modularly
discharged by an automatic theorem prover [47].
3.3 Alloy
Alloy is a textual, declarative modeling language based on first-order relational
logic. An Alloy model consists of Signatures, Relations, Facts and Predicates.
Signatures represent the entities of a system and Relations depict the relations be-
tween such entities. Facts and Predicates specify constraints, which apply on the
Signatures and Relations [39].
Alloy comes with a tool, the Alloy Analyzer, which supports fully automated
analysis of Alloy models. The analyser provides two main functionalities, Simula-
tion and Assertion checking. Simulation produces a random instance of the model,
which conforms to the specification. This ensures that the developed model is not
inconsistent. Assertions are constraints, which the model needs to satisfy.
The Alloy Analyzer works by translating Alloy formulas to boolean expres-
sions, which are analysed by SAT solvers embedded within the analyser. A user-
specified scope on the model elements bounds the domain. If an instance that
violates an assertion is found within the scope, the assertion is not valid. However,
if no instance is found, the assertion might be invalid in a larger scope.
An Alloy model is a collection of constraints that describes (implicitly) a set
of structures, for example: all the possible security configurations of a web appli-
cation, or all the possible topologies of a switching network. The Alloy Analyzer,
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is a solver that takes the constraints of a model and finds structures that satisfy
them. It can be used both to explore the model by generating sample structures,
and to check properties of the model by generating counterexamples. Structures
are displayed graphically, and their appearance can be customized for the domain
at hand.
At its core, the Alloy language is a simple but expressive logic based on the
notion of relations, and was inspired by the Z specification language and Tarski
relational calculus. Alloy syntax is designed to make it easy to build models in-
crementally, and was influenced by modeling languages (such as the object models
of OMT and UML). Novel features of Alloy include a rich subtype facility for
factoring out common features and a uniform and powerful syntax for navigation
expressions.
Alloy is influenced by Z, but has a syntax that mimics object-oriented lan-
guages, making it accessible to Java developers.
3.4 SAL
SAL stands for Symbolic Analysis Laboratory. It is a framework for combining dif-
ferent tools for abstraction, program analysis, theorem proving, and model check-
ing toward the calculation of properties (symbolic analysis) of transition systems.
A key part of the SAL framework is an intermediate language for describing tran-
sition systems. This language is intended to serve as the target for translators that
extract the transition system description for other modeling and programming lan-
guages, and as a common source for driving different analysis tools1.
1http://sal.csl.sri.com/
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3.5 ASM Tools
Gurevich’s Abstract State Machines (ASMs) constitute a high-level state-based
modeling language, which has been used in a wide range of applications. The
ASM Workbench is a comprehensive tool environment supporting the develop-
ment and computer-aided analysis and validation of ASM models. It is based on
a typed version of the ASM language, called ASM-SL, and includes features for
type-checking, simulation, debugging, and verification of ASM models [19].
3.6 PVS
PVS is a prototype verification system: that is, a specification language integrated
with support tools and a theorem prover. It is intended to capture the state-of-the-
art in mechanized formal methods and to be sufficiently rugged that it can be used
for significant applications. PVS is a research prototype: it evolves and improves
as we develop or apply new capabilities, and as the stress of real use exposes new
requirements [58, 57].
3.7 Event-B and Pro-B
Event-B2 is a formal method for system-level modeling and analysis. Key features
of Event-B are the use of set theory as a modeling notation, the use of refinement to
represent systems at different abstraction levels and the use of mathematical proof
to verify consistency between refinement levels [1, 63, 68, 2].
2http://www.event-b.org/
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Pro-B offers very similar functionality to the Alloy Analyzer; it can generate
counterexamples to assertions fully automatically.
3.8 KeY Tool
KeY is a tool that provides facilities for formal specification and verification of
programs within a commercial platform for UML based software development.
Using the KeY tool, formal methods and object-oriented development techniques
are applied in an integrated manner. Formal specification is performed using the
Object Constraint Language (OCL), which is part of the UML standard [3].
3.9 Analysis and Comparison
My criteria for assessing which tools, language and methodology to use for analysis
of ballot counting are:
1. Ability to express first-order logic
2. Object-orientedness
3. Java support
which led to the selection of BON, JML and Alloy as design, specification and
modeling languages, respectively, with the most emphasis on JML and Alloy, and
with a lessor emphasis on BON. In particular, I did not use the more formal part of
BON since that can be derived directly from the JML, and vice versa.
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Chapter 4
Verification in Voting
This chapter will discuss the use of verification technology in existing voting sys-
tems e.g. KOA [46]. KOA is interesting because of the use of JML to specify its
tally system.
4.1 Waterford Institute of Technology
Meagher used Z and B to model the PR-STV based election process at Waterford
Institute of Technology [55]. The election process was a variant of PR-STV with
gender and faculty limits. On reaching the quota for election, a candidate who
exceeded one of the limits would be excluded instead of deemed elected, and all of
his or her votes would be made available for transfer. Likewise, in some cases the
least continuing candidate is exempt from exclusion if he or she is needed to fulfill
one of the lower bounds, and therefore the second lowest candidate is perhaps
excluded instead. In other words the WIT election scheme is PR-STV with special
rules for exclusion or non-exclusion of candidates.
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4.2 Voting Machines in the Netherlands
Electronic voting machines (EVMs) were introduced in the Netherlands around
19981. The primary supplier of these machines is Nedap2, the same supplier as in
Ireland.
However, as attention has been focused the world over on EVMs, the Dutch
parliament had begun to re-evaluate its approach. In keeping with this reassess-
ment, the Dutch parliament decided to conduct experiments with the next natural
step in the use of technology for voting: remote voting using both the internet and
telephone.
4.2.1 Kiezen op Afstand (KOA)
The genesis of KOA stemmed from a promise made by the Dutch government to
parliament that they would investigate possible developments in the Dutch voting
system. This promise was fulfilled in the KOA experiment by allowing expatri-
ates to vote in the elections to the European Parliament via the internet and by
telephone.
However, Dutch national election law is quite explicit about what is permitted
with respect to how votes may be cast. Therefore, in order to conduct an experiment
in voting over the internet, some amendments to this general law were formulated.
This formed the legal foundation for the KOA project.
Apart from the general rules governing internet voting, it also included some
additional rules detailing a citizen’s right to vote from a different polling booth
other than the one originally appointed. However, in this chapter the KOA project
1http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersneit.nl/English
2Nedap — http://www.nedap.com/.
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is described purely as if it was an internet voting experiment.
Internet Voting in The Netherlands The elections to the European Parliament
of June 2004 allowed remote voting via the internet and telephone. It was limited
to expatriates who were required to explicitly register beforehand. It was thought
that such a small-scale use (thousands of voters) would provide a useful real-world
test for the technology.
The main reason why it was thought that an internet-based solution was suit-
able is decidedly non-technical. Essentially, by significantly constraining the re-
mote voting problem, particularly with respect to the registration and voting pro-
cess itself, it was believed that a “sufficiently secure” and reliable system could be
constructed. In particular, the system needed to be at least as secure and reliable as
the existing remote voting system which was based upon postal ballots.
The Remote Voting Process When a citizen registers to use KOA, the voter
chooses their own personal access code (a PIN). Some time later, a customized
information packet is mailed to the voter. This packet contains general information
about the vote itself (date, time, etc.), as well as voter-customized details that are
known to only that voter. These details include information for voter authentica-
tion, including an identification code and the previously chosen access code.
Also included is a list of all candidates. Each candidate is assigned a large set
of unique random numbers3, and exactly one of those numbers is given to each
voter. The set of codes per voter is determined randomly but is not unique.
To vote, a registered voter logs in to a web site with their voter code and access
31,000 codes were generated for each candidate for the elections to the European Parliament in
2004.
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code. They then step through a series of simple web pages, typing in their candidate
codes as appropriate for their choices. The system shows the voter the actual names
and parties of the candidates in question to confirm the accuracy of the vote. When
a voter is finished, a transaction code is provided. This code can later be used to
check in a published list that the voter’s choices were included correctly in the final
tally.
All votes are stored in a doubly-encrypted fashion; each vote is encrypted by a
symmetric key per voter4 and the public key of the voting authority.
Use and GPL Release The trial during the elections to the European Parliament
in June, 2004 was restricted to roughly 16,000 eligible Dutch expatriates. Expatri-
ates could vote either via the internet or by telephone. The telephone votes were
fed into the KOA tally system. 5,351 people used one or other system.
Subsequently, in July 2004, the Dutch Government released the majority of the
source code for the KOA system under the GNU General Public License (GPL)
making it the first Open Source internet voting system in the world.
Vote Counting System As seen in the previous section, one of the results of
the recommendation to split the responsibilities of the parties involved, was that
the government decided to accept bids for the creation of a separate vote count-
ing subsystem, to be implemented in isolation by a third party. This separate tally
application would allow the vote counting to be independently verified. The Secu-
rity of Systems (SoS) (now called Digital Security) group at Radboud University
Nijmegen5 put forward a proposal to write this application, and were successful
4This symmetric key is generated by hashing the assigned identification code.
5http://www.ru.nl/ds/
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in this bid. The key idea behind their tender was that the vote counting program
should be formally verified using the JML and ESC/Java2 tools.
The vote counting system formed a small but important part of the whole KOA
system. This provided the SoS group with a suitable opportunity to test the use
of some of the formal techniques and practices that they had been developing.
Given the severe time constraints placed upon them due to the impending election,
the application was built by three members of the group over a barely-sufficient
period of four weeks. Java was chosen as the programming language in which
to implement the system so that JML could be used as the formal specification
language. Due to the time constraints, verification was only attempted with the
core modules.
Counting votes within KOA proceeds offline using a separate tally application.
The input to this application consists of two XML files (one containing the list of
candidates and their codes, and one containing the encrypted votes), and a pub-
lic/private key pair used to decrypt the votes.
As the informal requirements of vote-counting are obvious (for every candidate
in the candidate list count the number of votes for that candidate), the functional
specification [53] (in Dutch) mostly prescribes details of file formats and encryp-
tion algorithms to be used.
Nevertheless, the functional specification does impose some requirements that
greatly influence the structure of the Java application and its JML specification.
First, the different tasks that need to be performed in order to count the votes (read-
ing in the two files, reading in the keys, decrypting the contents of the votes file,
counting the votes, generating reports) are made explicit in this document and,
more importantly, the order in which they have to be performed is specified. Sec-
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ond, the document provides a rough sketch of the user interface and its contents.
Finally, the document gives some bounds on the data, such as the lengths of fields
or the maximum number of candidates in each list, which are incorporated in the
JML specifications of the data structures.
In accordance with the above high-level specification, the resulting tally appli-
cation consists of some 30 classes, which can be grouped into three categories: the
data structures, the user interface, and the tasks.
The data structure classes form an excellent opportunity to write JML speci-
fications. Typical concepts from the domain of voting, such as candidate, district
and municipality can be modeled with detailed JML specifications.
The different tasks associated with counting votes were mapped to individual
classes. After successful completion of a task, the application state is changed.
A task can only be started if the application is in an appropriate state. The life-
cycle model of the application that therefore emerges is maintained in the main
class of the application inside a simple integral field. This life-cycle model can
be specified in JML using invariants and constraints, essentially stating that on
successful completion of the application, the application went from “initial state”
to “votes counted state”. The state of attributes associated with the individual tasks
can be linked to the application life-cycle state using invariants. For instance, such
an invariant could read: ‘after the application reaches the “keys imported state”,
the private key field is no longer null’. This is stated in MenuPanel.java as
follows:
/*@ invariant
@ (state >= PRIVATE_KEY_IMPORTED_STATE
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@ implies privateKey != null);
*/
A graphical user interface is usually not very amenable to formal specification.
Nonetheless, some light-weight specifications were written. One of the require-
ments defined in the original informal specification was that users should not be
allowed to start certain tasks before certain other tasks are successfully completed.
For instance, a user should (by means of the user interface) not be able to start de-
crypting votes before the votes are read in from file. In the graphical user interface,
this demand is met by only enabling certain buttons when the application reaches
certain states in the life-cycle model. The fact that the graphical user interface
complies with the life-cycle model can be neatly specified in the GUI classes by
referring to the application state.
Process As already stated, ESC/Java2 was only used to verify the core of the
tally application. This means that it was used to verify reading in the XML-files
with the candidates and the votes, decryption of the votes and counting the votes.
The final generation of the reports is not checked with JML.
Using JML on reading XML files is quite straightforward. Essentially, for
every object that is read, some methods are called that specify that the total number
of objects will be increased by exactly one. Naturally, in order to verify code
that uses functionality provided in external libraries, some of the corresponding
APIs must also be specified. The JML community has provided specifications for
most of the APIs that come with Sun’s standard edition of Java. However, APIs
dealing with cryptography, XML parsing, and PDF generation, as used by the tally
application had not previously been specified. These APIs were specified in a light-
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weight manner: the specifications mostly deal with purity and non-null references
in the API methods which makes verification of client code using ESC/Java2 much
easier.
Naturally, the counting process is likewise formally specified in JML, which
ensures that each valid vote is counted for exactly one candidate. This also implies
that specifications are easy to check to make sure that the total number of votes a
party list receives is equal to the sum of votes for each candidate6 on this party list.
The JML run-time assertion checker was also used in the development process.
First, for testing the data structure classes, the checker was used to generate unit
tests. Second, they ran the full application, including user interface, using the
checker.
Bounded Verification Dennis et al, found errors in the JML specification for
KOA, using bounded verification techniques [20].
6Including the ‘blanco’ or ‘blank ballot’ candidate.
Chapter 5
Danish Voting
My first case study concerns formal specification of ballot counting in Denmark.
The formalisation of the Danish Voting System (DiVS) was achieved in collab-
oration with MSc student O´lavur Kjo¨lbro [49], who contributed the background
knowledge about the workings of the Danish voting system, and worked out the
details of the algorithm and proofs.
5.1 Analysis
List Voting is the most common form of proportional representation. Denmark uses
an open list voting system; it allows voters to overrule the recommended order of
candidates on a party list, because Danish citizens vote for either for one person or
else for one party.
In Denmark the D’Hondt method is used to allocate compensatory seats(mandates)
by the method of highest averages. Any party with sufficient constituency votes is
eligible for compensatory party seats. The second ranked candidate gets half of the
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party vote, the third ranked candidate gets one-third of the party vote and so on.
Ranking of candidates is based on personal votes received
The Folketing (Danish parliament) is unicameral and has 179 seats of which
the Faroe Islands and Greenland have two seats each; the elections in the Faroe
Islands and Greenland follow different rules and are not included in this analysis.
Out of the 175 seats 135 seats are constituency seats, and 40 are additional seats;
the additional seats are used to level unevenness. The electoral map of Denmark
consists of 3 provinces and 10 multi-member constituencies.
The allocation of seats is done in 6 steps:
• Allocate constituency seats on constituency level
• Determine threshold on national level
• Allocate additional seats to parties on national level
• Allocate additional seats to parties on province level
• Allocate additional seats to parties on constituency level
• Select candidates
The formal specification covers only the most interesting aspects of the election
procedures. These things are left out:
• Register electoral map
• Register parties and candidates
• Party list
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• Party gets more seats in a constituency than there are candidates (this rarely
happens)
• Substitution list
• Lots drawn on district level when distributing party votes
• Handling rounding errors
5.1.1 State Charts
From the election procedures, state charts can be derived to model the election.
The states in figures 5.1 and 5.2 have been grouped together on two levels so that
the result is a two-tier state machine. These are referred to as the outer and the
inner state machines respectively. The former covers the election procedures, and
the latter covers the computation of the results.
The states in the state charts are capitalized in case it is a normal state repre-
senting the state that the system (the election) is in currently, e.g. Election Closed.
The transitions between the states, consist of lower case letters in order to distin-
guish them from normal states. The actions are denoted by the oblong shapes on
the charts.
The states in the outer state machine are all sequential. The state Before Elec-
tion is a before the election when everything is prepared. The states Election Open
and Election Closed are on the Election Day. Preliminary Results Computed is
usually late on election night. The final counting starts the very next day after
Election Day and the Final Results Computed is usually about two days after the
election.
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Figure 5.1: Outer state chart
Inside the compute preliminary results and compute final results action state
there is an inner state machine shown in figure 5.2.
These inner states follow directly from the procedure described in the Danish
electoral law. If there are no ties that must be broken, then only the action states
in the middle are used (i.e. all states/transitions inside the dotted square). The
action states starting with the word resolve are meant for resolving draw issues.
According to the Danish electoral law, ties must be broken by drawing lots. The
state No Passing Parties is added, since there is no guarantee that any party will
pass the threshold. The next transition from Step 4 Done is either resolve step 4
draw or allocate additional seats to provinces dependent on the presence of draws.
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Figure 5.2: Inner state chart for Danish Voting
5.2 Verification and Tests
The intention had been to use an extended static checking (ESC) tool to check
the implementation of DiVS, which has been implemented using Java 1.6. It was
not possible to use ESC/Java2, because ESC/Java2 only supports Java 1.4. The
OpenJML plug-in for Eclipse features an ESC tool that was also tried out. Open-
JML uses the JML4c compiler, which does not yet support quantified expressions.
Therefore it was left out too. Instead of rewriting the code in Java 1.4 a choice was
made to outline a proof of correctness instead. This can be thought of as manual
static checking; i.e. the proofs inspect the methods to ensure that they do what the
methods must guarantee according to the specifications.
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5.2.1 Outlined Proof
In this section three of the transitions are outlined and proven. The first transition
is Check Preliminary Counting in the outer state machine, the second and third are
the Allocate Constituency Seats and the Allocate Constituency Seats to Provinces;
both in the inner state machine. The rest of the transitions are outlined and proven
in a similar way for both the outer and inner state machine1.
Allocate Constituency Seats (Inner State Machine)
The pre-conditions for this transition are:
• For each constituency result there must be a list containing all parties and
a list of all independent candidates and their votes. The list of constituency
results must be of size 10, which is the number of constituencies in Denmark
• No constituency seats have been taken yet
• No parties have taken any seats yet
• No candidates have been elected yet
• All parties running in the constituencies must be found in the list of parties
on the national level as well as on the provincial level for the province in
which the constituency belongs
• The inner state must be Before Computing
The post-conditions for this transition are:
1http://code.google.com/p/danishvotingsystem/wiki/OutlinedCorrectnessProof
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• For all constituency results the number of seats taken is greater than or equal
to the number of constituency seats belonging to constituency
• If there are no ties to break then all parties on the national level are updated
with the number of constituency seats won on the constituency level
• The inner state changes to Step 1 Done or Step 2 Resolved (if there are no
ties to break)
In order to verify the post conditions, it is necessary to look into how the algo-
rithm works:
1 for all constituency result
2 FindSeats(ConstituencyResult i)
3 if (for all constituency) seats taken =
constituency seats allocated to
constituency then
4 update result on the national level
FindSeats(ConstituencyResult cr)
5 create one div and add it to the div list
of every party in cr
6 while seats taken < constituency seats
allocated to constituency do
7 find the highest quotient among
parties and vote count for unelected
independent candidates
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8 locate party and/or un-elected independent
candidate with highest div value
9 if party then add one seat to party and
add one more div to div list
using the d’Hondt method
10 if independent candidate then
set him/her to elected
11 if seats taken > constituency seats
available in constituency then
12 mark all parties and/or independent
candidates with quotient = highest
The sixth pre condition ensures that as long as the predicate in the while-loop
is true, we will always find the highest quotient in step 7, above. If at least one
party gets at least one vote, then the quotient of those parties will always be larger
than zero. This is because the number of votes divided by 1, 2, 3, etc. is always
larger than 0. At some point the seats taken will be equal or greater than the num-
ber of constituency seats belonging to constituency, at which time the algorithm
terminates. In the last while-loop iteration, however, there might be quotients that
are equal among the involved parties and independent candidates. If they are, then
multiple seats get allocated in this last loop, and therefore the number of seats taken
in the province might be more than allocated to the province. This is exactly what
the first post conditions claims and is hereby verified.
The last if-statement of the algorithm says that if there are more seats taken
than there are seats available, then all involved parts are marked. If there is, during
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the last iteration of the while-loop, only one seat allocated, then seats taken would
equal constituency seats available. But if the if-statement in step 11 is true, then
there must be more than one allocated during the last iteration and involved parts
are marked. This is what the second post condition claims, and it is hereby verified.
At the end of the transition there is a check that investigates the presence of any
issues/draws in the constituencies (step 3). If there are no issues, then the number
of seats on the national level is updated. This satisfies the third post condition.
It has already been shown that the algorithm will terminate.
Allocate Additional Seats to Provinces (inner state machine)
The algorithm that allocates additional seats to the provincial level is complicated.
This subsection verifies both the allocation of the additional seats and the resolving
of possible draws. The pre conditions to this transition are:
• The number of additional seats taken must be 0
• For all provinces the number of additional seats taken must be 0
• For all parties in all provinces the number of additional seats taken must be
0
• The total number of additional seats allocated to parties on the national level
must be 40
• The total number of additional seats allocated to the provinces is equal to 40
• For all parties in all provinces the size of the div list must equal the number
of constituency seats + 1
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• All passing parties get at least one vote in all provinces
The pre conditions to this computational step are that all initializations are done
properly and no unresolved draws are left from previous transitions. The last pre-
condition, above, states the most common case in the elections.
The post conditions are:
• The number of additional seats taken is 40 (total number of additional seats
in Denmark)
• All provinces get exactly the number of additional seats that they are allo-
cated before hand
• On the provincial level, all parties, in total, receive the same number of ad-
ditional seats that they get on the national level
• The inner state is Step 4 Resolved
All post conditions in this transition merely state that there are no draws and that
all seats get allocated to the parties on the provincial level. In order to verify that
the post conditions are met, we need to look at the algorithm, that allocates the ad-
ditional seats on the provincial level, shown in pseudo code below. An explanation
follows.
1. while additional_seats_taken < 40 and not
TooManySeatsTaken do
2. highest := -1
3. for all un-arrested passing parties in
all un-arrested provinces
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4. find highest quotient
5. if no highest quotient found then break
6. ranking := additional_seats_taken
7. count := 0
8. for all passing parties in all provinces
9. for each quotients/div with value = highest
10. count := count + 1;
11. set quotients ranking = ranking
12. add 1 to province.additional_seats_taken
13. add 1 to party.additional_seats_taken
(national level)
14. add 1 to party.additional_seats
(province level)
15. add 1 to div list for party on
province level
16. accumulate additional_seats_taken by count
TooManySeatsTaken()
17. for all province results
18. if additional_seats_taken by province
result > additional_seats allocated to
province then
19. return true
20. for all passing parties on the national level
21. if additional_seats_taken by party >




A party result is put to rest if the party result has received its additional seats
allocated on the national level or more. A party that is un-arrested has not yet
received its additional seats. The same reasoning applies for provinces. Step 4
states: find highest quotient.
This means implicitly find highest quotient that is not crossed out. The most
common case involves no draws. Let’s first look into that. The while-loop (line 1)
will stop when at least 40 seats are taken. Because of the seventh pre condition it
will always be possible to find a highest quotient (line 3 and 4), and therefore the
if-statement on line 5 is always false. This causes every iteration of the while-loop
to allocate at least one additional seat to a party and a province. The algorithm will
therefore terminate at some point since all the additional seats will get allocated.
It is possible, however, that while-loop iterations allocate more than just one
additional seat. This doesn’t imply, however, that a draw is created; which is what
we assume for the moment. Therefore, when there are no draws, all post conditions
get verified.
The while-loop will terminate as soon as a draw is present. The definition of
a draw is: a party result takes, on the national level, more additional seats than it
has allocated, or a province takes more additional seats than it has allocated. The
sub-routine TooManySeatsTaken illustrates how the presence of draws is found.
The only possible way for a draw to occur is that two or more quotients are
equal. Furthermore, these quotients must belong to either the same party in several
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provinces (e.g. the last additional seat of a party getting allocated to two provinces)
or to the same province for several parties (e.g. the last additional seat of the
province getting allocated to two parties).
The worst case scenario is when several parties in several provinces draw for
the same seat; i.e. all parties in all provinces have a just claim on a seat, because
their quotients are the same. This would be the result of all possible combinations
of all passing parties in all provinces; e.g. if there are 10 passing parties then there
are 30 involved parts in the draw, taking into account that there are 3 provinces in
Denmark.
When the allocation of additional seats to the provincial level stops and the in-
ner state is not Step 4 Resolved, it means that there is a draw present. The algorithm
below works out the involved parts:
GetStepFourDraw
24. ranking := -1
25. for all passing parties in all provinces
26. find the highest quotients ranking
among the quotients
27. for all passing parties in all provinces
28. if quotients.ranking = ranking
29. StepFourDraw.addParty
30. StepFourDraw.addProvince
The algorithm first locates the highest ranking value among the parties on the
provincial level. The reason for this is that since the while-loop of the main al-
gorithm breaks as soon as a draw presents itself, the involved parts must have the
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highest ranking number. In order to know the involved parts, one simply has to
invoke GetStepFourDraw. Steps 29 and 30 add a party-province pair to a Step-
FourDraw instance.
The electoral law says that lots must be drawn to resolve ties. DiVS must be
informed about the result of the lots drawn. DiVS resolves issues through the al-
gorithm ResolveStep4Draw. The algorithm receives three parameters: rank, party
result, and province result. The semantics of the parameters is that the party result
in province result wins the ranking, and all others lose. The pre condition for the
algorithm is that there is a draw that must be resolved, and the post condition is
that there is not a draw that must be resolved.
ResolveStep4Draw(int rank, party pres,
province pr)
31. for all parties in all provinces
32. if quotients.ranking = rank and
( party != pres or province != pr )
33. subtract 1 from
province.additional_seats_taken
34. subtract 1 from
party.additional_seats_taken
(national level)
35. subtract 1 from
party.additional_seats
(province level)
36. remove from div list the last div and
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set ranking of last div to 0
37. subtract 1 from additional_seats_taken
The algorithm above resolves the draw issue by making all parts lose the draw
except for 1 party-province pair. This means that there are no draws left after
this issue, and the next transition from Step 4 Done is allocate additional seats to
provinces. The if-statement in line 32 ensures that all rankings are found, except
for the winning party-province pair that the algorithm receives as parameters. This
means that if the draw involves 3 party-province pairs and this method is called,
then the method removes all but what corresponds to the parameters received; i.e.
2 party-province pairs. Line number 37 is therefore called twice in this working
example. And when the main algorithm eventually resumes, then the ranking in
line 6 is set to a number which is 1 higher than it was before.
There’s no reason to suggest that ResolveStep4Draw doesn’t terminate. It has
already been shown, that when there are no draws then all additional seats are
allocated on the provincial level. When draws are involved this is also the case.
A possible draw slows down the process since it needs to be resolved before the
algorithm is resumed. After resolving one issue, the additional seats taken gets
closer to 40 by at least 1. It has been shown that ResolvStep4Draw completely
resolves a draw. Putting these two things together implies that eventually all draw
issues are resolved. This is exactly what the post conditions state, and it must
therefore be concluded that the algorithm is correct. It has already been shown that
the algorithms will terminate.
It is important to note that the last pre condition says that all passing parties get
votes in all provinces. If this pre condition is removed, then all parties might run
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in only some provinces or just one. The law says explicitly that if there are parties
that run in only one or two provinces then their additional seats should be allocated
before the others to ensure that the province is not arrested before party’s quotient
becomes the highest in the main algorithm. This is assuming that there are only
a few passing parties that don’t run in all provinces and allocating the additional
seats to these parties effectively resolves the issues. However, if all parties don’t
run in all provinces then there is a good chance that the situation mentioned above
occurs anyway. This is shown in the counterexample below.
All provinces have 45 constituency seats and 13 or 14 additional seats allo-
cated. 27 parties are running. They all get the same number of votes and they all
get 5 constituency seats each. The parties are only running in 1 province. In com-
putation step 3, the parties get allocated 6 or 7 seats total. This means that they
get 1 or 2 additional seats. Since all get the same number of votes their fractions
are all the same and therefore lots must be drawn.
The lots provide all parties in one province with 2 additional seats. This means
e.g. that 18 seats belong to parties in this province. The province has only 13 or 14
additional seats, and therefore the province gets arrested before all the additional
seats of the parties running in the province are allocated. In the main algorithm
the while-loop will only go through 2 iterations before producing a draw. In the
first, 27 additional seats get allocated.
This results in 14 parties getting arrested, since their only additional seat is
taken, but no provinces are arrested. In the second, the remaining 13 parties be-
come involved in a draw issue. This issue gets resolved by drawing lots with only
one winner, the ResolveStep4Draw is called, and the main algorithm is resumed.
The result is, that 15 parties are arrested and 12 parties are involved in a draw.
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Again this issue gets resolved, and it goes on.
At some point the province gets arrested, as well as all parties in the other
provinces. This means that line 4 will not find any highest quotient, and the if-
statement on line 5 becomes true. At this point there are no draws, since TooMany-
SeatsTaken returns false. But there exists on the national level a few parties that
haven’t received their additional seats yet on the provincial level. This violates the
post condition that all seats should be allocated.
Therefore the pre condition stating that all parties must get votes in all provinces
is kept.
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Chapter 6
Irish Voting
The second and more complete case study is about formal specification and testing
of Irish PR-STV voting.
6.1 Methodology
To appreciate the rigor involved in formally specifying and verifying a ballot count-
ing system for a non-trivial electoral system like PR-STV, discussing details about
our methodology is warranted.
6.1.1 Derivation of formal requirements from legal documents
This is potentially a complex issue. However, the legal framework for voting in
Ireland has been in existence for many elections and thus has been well tested and
is well understood. In addition, there are official guidelines for voting machine
developers and vendors. Thus, the requirements are already laid out in a semi-
formal structure, that is relatively unambiguous.
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6.1.2 Business Object Notation
Business Object Notation (BON) provides a high-level object orientated descrip-
tion of a system [71]. BON can be thought of as a rigorous subset of UML. BON
has two flavors: informal BON and formal BON. Informal BON looks like a struc-
tured natural language, but is checked for well-formedness in a variety of ways.
Formal BON looks like a strongly typed object-oriented, parametric class-based
programming language with contracts and behavioral specifications. Refinement
from informal to formal BON is described in the aforementioned text and supported
by Fairmichael’s BONc tool suite1.
6.1.3 Java Modeling Language
The Java Modeling Language (JML) is a formal behavioral interface specification
language used to specify the behavior of Java software [52]. It extends Java with
annotations for specifying simple formal statements in a design-by-contract (DBC)
style [12] and model-based specifications a la Larch [11]. Informal BON is either
refined to a formal specification in formal BON or directly to a formal object-
oriented specification language such as JML. Partial support for checking such
refinements is provided by the Beetlz tool2.
The initial JML specifications for Vo´ta´il were written by hand based on the
ASM, the table of functional requirements and the informal BON. For the final
version of Vo´ta´il, Beetlz was used to help derive the formal BON from the existing
JML specification.





Beetlz Beetlz is a tool for checking the consistency between BON and JML spec-
ifications. It is neither sound nor complete, but it does help to speed up the process
of writing formal specifications, by reducing the need for manual translation from
JML to BON, although as with any automated translation, the results are not always
precisely correct.
Therefore the refinement from BON to JML needs to be manually inspected
and corrected by hand.
6.1.4 Abstract State Machines
Abstract State Machines (ASM) are embedded within the JML specification,3 so as
to ensure that methods are called and used in the correct order. Whereas normally,
a precondition applies only to parameters and not to fields, we use a field called
‘state’ which represents the ASM for the class. Each transition in the ASM is
implemented as a Java method, for which the precondition is to be in one state and
the postcondition is to be in another state. The principal class, BallotCounting has
a two tier state machine. The Ballot and Candidate classes each have their own
simpler ASM.
Outer ASM for Count Process
The outer ASM is as described in previous work [14, 44]. Some examples of the
invariants for each outer state, excluding technical constraints such as non-nullity,
3The JML specification is a refinement of the ASM as well as being a refinement of the BON
design.
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States Invariant JML
PRELOAD No ballots loaded yet. totalVotes == 0;
PRECOUNT No candidates elected yet. numberElected == 0;
PRECOUNT No candidates excluded yet. numberEliminated == 0;
COUNTING There is at least one seat for election. 1 <= seats;
COUNTING Number of seats remaining remainingSeats ==
(seats - numberElected);
FINISHED All seats filled. numberElected == seats;
Figure 6.1: Invariants for some of the outer states
From State To State Java Method
Ready to Count No Seats Filled Yet BallotCounting
Surplus Available Ready for Next Round of Counting distributeSurplus
Figure 6.2: Part of the Inner ASM for ballot counting process
are shown in figure 6.1.
Inner ASM for Count Process
The inner ASM models the detailed count process. The possible states and transi-
tions are described in figure 6.2.
The inner ASM is implemented in the AbstractCountStatus class.
Candidate ASM
The Candidate can be in one of three states. The final state is either Elected or
Excluded and the initial state is Continuing.
Ballot ASM
The specification of the Ballot class also enforces the process of transferring the
ballot to another candidate. The transfer function moves to the next effective pref-
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erence on the ballot paper.

















Figure 6.3: Relationships between software engineering artifacts.
A set of functional requirements and features, derived from electoral law, is
a semi-formal specification, although written in a structured way. To translate
the ballot counting process, as defined by law, into an executable software sys-
tem we define an abstract state machine (ASM). This ASM and a set of functional
requirements (described later) are refined into an object-oriented system design us-
ing BON, which is in turn refined into a JML contract-based specification. The
JML specification and ASM are then implemented in Java. Thus, the development
follows a strict design-by-contract based approach to software engineering.
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Table 6.1: Cross-referencing functional requirements and the law.
ID Functional Requirement Section Item Page
9 Not more than one surplus is distributed in
any one count.
4 3 16
10 Where there are seats remaining to be filled,
but no surpluses available for distribution,
the lowest continuing candidate or candidates
must be excluded.
4 4 16
11 There must be at least one continuing candi-
date for each remaining seat.
4 4 16
...
Validation is accomplished via testing. Automated tests are generated from the
JML specification, and scenario tests are derived from the ASM. Finally, the entire
system is verified using extended static checking, a kind of automated functional
verification.
Figure 6.3 provides an overview of these artifacts and their interrelationships.
6.2 Formal Specification
Requirements are derived from electoral law and regulations for the counting of
votes. In the Irish context, these requirements come from a commission on voting
and electoral law and from the electoral act itself.
The 1992 Electoral Act, including subsequent amendments, and the Commen-
tary on Count Rules issued by the CEV [23], is the starting point for the require-
ments analysis. In previous work 39 semi-formal statements are used to describe
these functional requirements for ballot counting in elections to the Da´il [14].
A few example formal statements from our previous work are listed and cross-
referenced, as shown in Table 6.1. The section, item and page column titles refer to
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the CEV Commentary on Count Rules, which in turn refers back to the Electoral
Acts.
The formal specification has several aspects. First, we must formalize the ballot
counting process — the steps through which one must pass to convert a pile of legal
ballots into a tally. Secondly, we must capture the various stages through which
each key element of the counting process (e.g., a candidate, a ballot, a ballot box,
etc.) can pass. The formalization of these two different, but interrelated, facets of
the specification are done via the use of ASMs.
6.2.1 Abstract State Machine
(1) Ready to 
Count
(2) No Seats 
Filled Yet
(A) Calculate Quota
 (D) Calculate Number of 
Votes to Transfer
 (4) Candidate Is 
Deemed to be 
Elected
 (6) Surplus 
Available
(C) Calculate Surplus
(B) Find Highest Continuing Candidate With Quota
 (13) Last Seat Being 
Filled (Single Winner 
IRV)
(16) All Seats Filled
(10) Ready to Move 
Ballots (L) Move the Ballots
(12) Ready for Next 
Round of Counting
(5) No Surplus 
Available





(M) Check Remaining Seats
(15) One or 
More Seats 
Remaining
(K) Count Continuing Candidates
(14) More Continuing Candidates 
Than Remaining Seats
(18) Just One 
Continuing Candidate 
For Each Remaining 
Seat
(N) Declare Remaining 
Candidates Elected
Figure 6.4: Abstract State Model, lower tier (sub-states)
A two tier Abstract State Machine (ASM) is used to represent the 39 func-
tional requirements. The upper tier of the ASM describes the state of the election
(EMPTY, SETTING UP, PRELOAD, LOADING, PRECOUNT, COUNTING, FINISHED,
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AUDIT, REPORT) in a linear way, in which there is only one possible transition
into and out of each state, whereas the lower tier of the ASM (shown in 6.4) is
more complex and describes more detailed sub-states and transitions within the
COUNTING state.
6.2.2 Invariants
An invariant is a predicate about a set of objects in the system that must always hold
during stable/quiescent states during system execution. In essence, the invariants
of an object and its class hierarchy explain what constitutes a valid instance of the
object in question. Likewise, invariants about the states of an ASM explain what
must be true of the process and the objects on which it operates for the process
itself to be valid.
/** Number of candidates elected so far */
public model int numberElected;
public invariant 0 <= numberElected;
public invariant numberElected <= seats;
public invariant (state <= PRECOUNT) implies numberElected == 0;
protected invariant (COUNTING <= state) implies
numberElected == (\num_of int i;
0 <= i && i < totalCandidates; isElected(candidateList[i]));
public invariant (state == FINISHED) implies numberElected == seats;
Figure 6.5: A JML specification describing the number of candidates elected.
Each election state has a number of invariants that must hold. For example, in
the fragment of JML seen in figure 6.5, the Finished state has as an invariant that
the number of candidates elected equals the number of seats available, whereas
the Pre-Count state has an invariant that the number of candidates elected (so far)
is zero. Invariants are coupled to states in the ASM through a variable state
6.2. FORMAL SPECIFICATION 55
denoting the obvious. Some invariants must only hold in a given state and others
must hold for that state and all future states, as in the example.
6.2.3 Coupling State Transitions
Reasoning about the overall correctness of the counting algorithms implementation
boils down to reasoning about the top-level ASM. If we can show that each transi-
tion in the ASM is valid (it only goes from legal pre-states to legal-post states, as
defined by law), then we can guarantee, by transitivity, that the overall algorithm
is correct. The correctness of these transitions is captured entirely by invariants,
which are preserved in the top-level state transitions.
Similar reasoning is used to analyze the correctness of each invariant on each
state of the ASM, invariants that span ASM states, as well as the legitimacy of
transitions between states.
6.2.4 Other Examples of Invariants
All invariants must hold in every state, not just those state pairs at the end of transi-
tions in the top-level ASM. These legal invariants are expressed by class and object
invariants in the JML specification. Consequently, when a transition between states
occurs, the invariants of both the old and new state must hold during the transition
(i.e., during any helper methods that are called while the software is moving be-
tween states).
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Transitions into Invariant for new state
End of Count The number of candidates elected equals the
number of open seats.
No Surplus Available All continuing candidates have less than a
quota of votes.
No Seats Filled Yet The number of elected candidates is zero.
Candidates Have Quota There exists a continuing candidate with at
least one quota of votes.
Candidate Excluded This candidate had fewer votes than any other
continuing candidate.
Last Seat Being Filled The number of elected candidates is one fewer
than the number of open seats.
Seats Remaining The number of elected candidates is less than
the number of open seats.
Figure 6.6: Examples of invariants for each sub-state, translated from JML to En-
glish for the reader.
6.2.5 Refinement to BON
To formally capture legal requirements, as expressed through invariants, and to
rigorously refine our ASMs into a software system, the architecture of our ballot
counting system (i.e., its classifiers and their relations) and its correctness proper-
ties (i.e., its invariants) are formally specified in the Business Object Notation.
Each state transition in the Abstract State Model is represented either by a
command or a query in BON. In BON, a command is an action that changes the
state of an object, for example, moving a ballot from one pile to another, whereas a
query returns some information about the system. A query is implemented in JML
either as a field with invariants or as a pure method.
The example in figure 6.7 shows an informal BON description of the Ballot
Counting process.
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class_chart BALLOT_COUNTING
explanation
"Count algorithm for tallying of the votes
in Dail elections"
query
"How many continuing candidates?",
"How many remaining seats?",
"What is the quota?",
"Who is/are highest continuing candidate(s)
with a surplus?",
"What is the surplus?",
"What is the transfer factor?"
command
"Distribute the surplus ballots",
"Select lowest continuing candidates for
exclusion",
"Declare remaining candidates elected",
"Close the count"
end
Figure 6.7: An Informal BON description of the Ballot Counting class.
6.2.6 Refinement to JML Specification
The BON design contains 1 cluster4 with 5 classifiers, 20 queries, 5 commands
and 6 constraints. These are refined to 1 package with 10 classes, 104 methods, 70
invariants, 192 preconditions and 117 postconditions in JML.
We used a version of JML that extends Java 1.4, because of existing mature tool
support. We also minimize our use of the JDK and use simple data structures such
as arrays. When using arrays in JML we make assumptions about the maximum
number of candidates and the maximum number of ballots, based on past elections
and the theoretical maximum population of a constituency.
4A BON cluster is a collection of related concepts, roughly similar to a Java package.
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/** Number of votes needed to win a seat */
requires 0 <= seats;
ensures \result == 1 + (totalVotes / (seats + 1));
public pure int getQuota();
Figure 6.8: An example of a JML specification for a BON query.
Two examples of JML are shown in figures 6.8 and 6.9, one for a query and one
for a command, and are examples of the initial JML specification written during re-
finement. Such a specification contains only the signature of each method without
implementation code (the implementation is “bottom,” aka “assert false.”). Note
also that the method signature specification in this example states in a precondition
that none of the parameters can have null values.
6.2.7 Limited Verification
Our toolset for verification has some important limitations. This means that we
cannot achieve full program verification with the existing generation of JML tools.
Length of Verification Conditions
In many cases, specifications need to be rewritten and simplified so as to avoid
overly complex verification conditions, that ESC/Java2 (or its theorem provers) are
unable to handle.
Loop Invariants, Summation and Generalized Quantifiers Some calculations
were specified as a summation and implemented using loops. ESCJava2 could nei-
ther verify the loop invariants nor the post-condition of such methods, for example
in the method Candidate.getTotalVote:
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/**








* Number of votes to be transferred
*/
requires fromCandidate.getStatus() != CandidateStatus.CONTINUING;







public abstract void transferVotes(
final non_null Candidate fromCandidate,
final non_null Candidate toCandidate,
final int numberOfVotes);
Figure 6.9: An example of a JML specification for a BON command.
The solution, in this case, is to strengthen the loop invariant, so as to make it
easier to verify.
In cases where this is not possible, the alternative solution is to isolate the un-
verified part of each method, using refactoring, so that the offending code would be
easy to inspect manually. It is hoped that future verification tools such as OpenJML
will have more success with this code.
The Java code is written in such a way as to be verification friendly, in many
cases simplified so that it is easy for verification tools (such as ESCJava2) to under-
stand, for example by avoiding reliance on third-party or non-standard APIs. This
also helps make the code easy to read.
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/**
* Total number of votes received by or added to this candidate.
*
* @return Gross total of votes received
*/
requires lastCountNumber < votesAdded.length;
ensures \result == (\sum int i;
0 <= i && i <= lastCountNumber; votesAdded[i]);
public pure int getTotalVote() {
int totalVote = 0;
loop_invariant votesAdded[i] <= totalVote;





Figure 6.10: An example of a JML Loop Invariant.
Decision to use Java instead of a functional programming language
Java, version 1.4, is used because it is multiplatform and has existing tool sup-
port from the JML community, and others. However, a functional programming
language or domain specific language might lead to a simpler specification and
implementation.
However many of the ESC warnings found would have been unnecessary in a
more strongly typed language, or even in a more recent version of Java, but there
was no JML tool support for modern Java, when this work was started.





















Figure 6.11: Relationship between classes
6.2.8 Architecture
election.tally package
There are 10 Java classes in the election.tally package, representing the actors in the
system, for example Ballots, Ballot Boxes and Candidates. Figure 6.11 shows the
relationship between the Java classes. The BallotCounting class contains the
specifics of PR-STV, whereas the AbstractBallotCounting class contains
the more general properties of ballot counting algorithms. Class names shown in
italics are supporting classes that were added in the Java implementation but were
not refined from BON.
other supporting packages
ie.votail.test This package contains ten hand-written scenario tests derived from
the inner ASM of the BallotCounting class. These tests cover 97 % of the elec-
tion.tally package, according to the metrics used by the Emma plugin for Eclipse.
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ie.votail.model, ie.uilioch These packages contain the framework for model-
based test generation, which will be described in the next chapter.
6.3 The Vo´ta´il Hypothesis
Due to the manner in which the formal specification of the ballot counting algo-
rithms is accomplished and the aforementioned argument about the correctness of
state transitions (section 6.2), we summarize via informal refinement the overall
theorem expressed by this ballot counting system as the Vo´ta´il Hypothesis.
Vo´ta´il Hypothesis: Given a valid set of candidates up for election for
a set of seats, and a ballot box containing a valid set of ballots, after the
ballot counting algorithm executes, we guarantee that the candidates
deemed elected by Vo´ta´il are exactly those elected by Irish law, where
casting of lots and shuffling of ballots are simulated by sorting the
ballots and candidates into a secret order beforehand.
In other words, the candidates elected by a machine count are the same as would
be elected in a correct manual count of paper based ballots.
6.4 Verification and Validation
6.4.1 Open Source Implementation
The Vo´ta´il source code is open source, under the terms of the MIT open source
license5, and is available from the Mercurial repository on JavaForge http://
5http://www.opensource.org/licenses/MIT
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javaforge.com/hg/voting6. The source code contains 723 Java statements
in 11 classes and 92 methods.
6.4.2 Scenario Tests
Ten hand-written scenario tests are derived from the ASM and provide 97 percent
code coverage. To measure coverage we use the EclEmma7 code coverage plug-in
for the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment8 and run tests using JUnit.
However 100% code coverage can be achieved using automatic generation of
test data, derived from a formal model of the ballot counting process. This is
described in chapter 7.
6.4.3 Extended Static Analysis
The Extended Static Checker for Java version 2 (ESC/Java2) is a programming tool
that attempts to find common run-time errors in JML-annotated Java programs by
static analysis of the program code and its formal annotations [16]. Users control
the amount and kinds of checking that ESC/Java2 performs by annotating their
programs with specially formatted comments called pragmas. ESC/Java2 is used
to type check the JML specifications and to check that the Java implementation
fulfills these specifications.
No flags were provided to ESC/Java2, I used the default configuration for the
ESC/Java2 Eclipse plugin as part of the Mobius Program Verification Environment
(PVE) configuration for Eclipse. I used the loopsafe option, as there are many
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Frame Conditions Each method has a full assignable clause. I relied on ESC/-
Java2 to check these frame conditions.
ESC/Java2 is used to both type check the JML specifications and to check that
the Java implementation fulfills these specifications.
This verification is complemented by the aforementioned testing because ES-
C/Java2 is neither sound nor complete. While we have used its functionality to
check that specifications are sound [41] and that we have not ventured into any ter-
ritory that touches on the soundness and completeness issues inherent in the tool’s
design and implementation [45], only via rigorous, well-designed testing are we
assured that the system is functioning correctly in an actual execution environment.
Chapter 7
Alloy Model
7.1 Model Driven Testing
As stated previously, static analysis, in itself is neither sound nor complete, whereas
Runtime Assertion Checking (RAC) is sound but requires a complete set of test
cases. We wish to achieve full statement and path coverage, however we cannot
test all possible inputs to the system in a reasonable time frame.
Many researchers have already written about the limitations of random test
generation [18, 15]. A more promising approach, albiet with some limitations,
is the use of model checkers to generate witnesses or counter examples. At first
glance, this might appear to be similar to our approach, but has the disadvantage of
state-space explosion, and does not guarantee full path coverage [5, 38].
Dijkstra’s Dictum Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs,
but never to show their absence [25].
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Jackson’s Small Scope Hypothesis Most bugs have small counterexamples [40].
In order to show the absence of bugs with the smallest possible test cases I
decided to use the Alloy model finder to describe the PR-STV count algorithm.
In this chapter I describe my formalization of Irish PR-STV using the Alloy An-
alyzer for the purpose of test generation. The model contains 2 enumerations, 5
signatures, 60 facts and 24 assertions for PR-STV. A fact in Alloy is an axiom, and
an assertion is a lemma. Later in this chapter, I show how to use the Alloy Ana-
lyzer to model PR-STV and then generate a complete set1 of PR-STV test cases
for use with Runtime Assertion Checking (RAC). Remember that RAC is sound
(unlike Extended Static Checking which is neither sound nor complete), but its
completeness depends on the completeness of the test data. The test data needs
to be complete, not in the sense of covering every possible combination of ballot
papers, but in covering every possible type of election outcome and every branch
through the vote counting algorithm.
Number of Different Combinations of Ballot Papers
To concretize completeness we need to analyze the space complexity of elections.




where C = |C| and partial ballots are allowed, so that the number of preferences
used range in length from one to the number of candidates. For a ballot of length
l, (C)l is the number of distinct preferences that can be expressed.
In general, the number of possible ballots grows factorially (i.e. faster than
exponential), while the number of equivalence classes due to symmetries grows
linearly.
1a set that contains at least one representative from each equivalence class (election scenario)
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Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to leverage these symmetries in the
generation of tests from a naive ballot-centric point-of-view because the number
of ballot boxes grows exponentially. For example, even if we know that there are
only a linear number of equivalence classes of ballots, how do we know how many
ballot boxes to generate to fully test a system?
One approach to validating/testing electoral systems (if they are tested at all)
is to randomly generate hundreds of thousands (or, indeed, even millions) of ballot
boxes and then to compare the results of executing two or more different implemen-
tations of the same voting scheme. If different results are found, then the ballots
are counted manually to determine which result is correct [17].
This methodology has limited effectiveness, because even if one generates bil-
lions of ballots in non-trivial election schemes, the fraction of the state space ex-
plored is vanishingly small. To make this clear, we will analyze the number of
distinct combinations of preferences possible in PR-STV ballots.
Number of Distinct Outcomes
If B is the number of distinct non-empty ranked choices that can be made, and
V = |B| is the number of votes cast, then the number of possible combinations of




For example, consider a five seat constituency with a voting population of





100,000, an astronomical number of tests which would be impossible
to run, even if each individual test took only a fraction of a second.
To avoid this explosion, we partition the set of all possible ballot boxes into
equivalence classes with respect to the counting algorithm chosen. We consider
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the equivalence class of election results for PR-STV. Each election result consists
of the set of Election Outcomes for each candidate.
7.1.1 Election Outcomes
The key idea is that election scenarios represent an equivalence class of election
outcomes, thereby letting us collapse the testing state space due to symmetries
in candidate outcomes. We will return to this point in detail below in the early
examples.
Each election result is described by an election scenario which is a vector of
candidate outcome events. Both of these terms are defined in the following.
The inner ASM of the ballot counting algorithm (see figure 6.4) is modeled
as a set of events defined in figure 7.1. The paths through the Inner ASM for each
election outcome are shown in figure 7.2. Note the election outcomes are defined
more precisely than the ASM (to capture the movement of ballot transfers as well
as the final outcome for each candidate) so that two or more Election Outcomes
can traverse the same path through the ASM. In particular the ASM does not show
a separate branch for handling of non-transferable votes, whereas both the JML re-
finement and the Alloy refinement do include the notion of non-transferable votes,
of the tie break and of the threshold for example.
The formal definition of an election outcome is found in the axioms that refer-
ence that outcome, for which an example will be given later after the definition of
each signature in the model.
7.1.2 Ballots and Ballots Boxes
The ranked choice (preference) ballot is modelled as follows:
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Outcome Informal Definition
WinnerNonTransferable elected on first round
with at least one non-transferable surplus vote
SurplusWinner elected on first round
with at least one surplus vote (all surplus votes are transferable)
Winner elected in the first round of counting by quota but with no surplus
AboveQuotaWinner elected with transferable surplus votes on second or later round
after receipt of transfers
QuotaWinnerNonTransferable elected on second or later round after receiving transfers
with at least one non-transferable surplus vote
QuotaWinner elected with quota after transfers from another candidate,
but without a surplus
CompromiseWinner elected on the last round of counting
without quota but by plurality
TiedWinner elected by tie breaker in the last round
TiedLoser defeated only by tie breaker
but reaches the threshold
TiedSoreLoser defeated only by tie breaker
but does not reach threshold
Loser defeated in last round
but reaches the minimum threshold of votes
SoreLoser defeated in last round,
but does not even reach the minimum threshold of votes
EarlyLoserNonTransferable reaches threshold
but is excluded before last round with some non-transferable votes
EarlyLoser reaches threshold
but is excluded before last round, all votes are transferable
EarlySoreLoser excluded before last round, and below threshold,
all votes are transferrable
EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable below threshold and excluded before last round
with at least one non-transferable vote
Figure 7.1: Informal Definition of each Election Outcome
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States Outcome
Candidate Deemed Elected, Surplus Available SurplusWinner
Candidate Deemed Elected, No Surplus Available Winner
Candidate Deemed Elected, Surplus Available WinnerNonTransferable
Candidate Deemed Elected, Surplus Available AboveQuotaWinner
Candidate Deemed Elected, Surplus Available QuotaWinnerNonTransferable
Candidate Deemed Elected, No Surplus Available QuotaWinner
Last Seat Being Filled, All Seats Filled CompromiseWinner
Last Seat Being Filled, All Seats Filled TiedWinner
Last Seat Being Filled, All Seats Filled TiedLoser
Last Seat Being Filled, All Seats Filled TiedSoreLoser
Last Seat Being Filled, All Seats Filled Loser





Figure 7.2: Examples of paths through the Inner ASM for each Election Outcome
sig Ballot {
assignees: set Candidate,
-- Candidates to whom this ballot has transferred
preferences: seq Candidate -- Ranking of candidates
}
where the assignees field is used to track the movement of the ballot. In the first
round of counting, each ballot has just one assignee, then new assignees are added
if the ballot is transferred. There is no need to know the order of assignees because
they follow the same order as the preferences, although preferences can be skipped
over, if the intervening candidates have been already elected or excluded, since a
ballot will be transferred to the highest preference for a continuing candidate (not
already elected or excluded).
The Ballot Box is defined as follows:
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one sig BallotBox {
spoiltBallots: set Ballot, -- empty ballots excluded from count
nonTransferables: set Ballot,
-- ballots for which all preferences are used up
size: Int -- number of unspoilt ballots
}
{
no b: Ballot | b in spoiltBallots and b in nonTransferables
size = #Ballot - #spoiltBallots
all b: Ballot | b in spoiltBallots iff #b ·preferences = 0
all b: Ballot | some c: Candidate |
b in nonTransferables implies b in c ·wasted
}
note that to avoid duplication of data, and adding too many fields to the model,
there is no direct mapping between the Ballot Box and every single ballot. There
is however a mapping between ballots and candidates.
7.1.3 Candidates
The stack of ballots in favor of a given candidate is modelled as follows:
sig Candidate {
votes: set Ballot, -- First preference ballots assigned
transfers: set Ballot, -- Second and subsequent preferences
surplus: set Ballot, -- Ballots transferred to another
wasted: set Ballot, -- Ballots non-transferable
outcome: Event -- Election outcome for each candidate
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}
In Alloy an axiom is either labelled as a fact or else appended to a type signature
sig. However it was found that the Alloy API when used from Java does not load
facts unless they are appended to the signature.
For example, the following appended axiom (on Ballots) enforces consistency
between the definition of ballots and candidates.
all c: Candidate | preferences ·first = c iff this in c ·votes
The appended axioms on Candidate enforce the meaning of the various outcomes,
for example, certain outcomes are possible only when there is a least one non-
transferable (wasted) vote:
0 < #wasted iff (outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable or
outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable or
outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable)
7.1.4 Electoral Constituency
The constituency for the election is modeled as follows:
one sig Election {
seats: Int, -- number of seats for election
constituencySeats: Int, -- full number of seats
method: Method -- PR-STV or plurality
}
{
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0 < seats and seats < = constituencySeats
seats < #Candidate
method = Plurality or method = STV
}
In a special election, or by-election, the number of seats to be filled can be less than
full number of seats. If only one seat is being filled then PR-STV reduces to Instant
Runoff Voting (IRV). The model also has parameters to support Plurality elections
by narrowing the range of possible outcomes and disallowing of transfers.
7.1.5 Electoral Scenarios
The Electoral Scenario is defined informally as a sequence of Election Outcomes,
but more formally as a set of winners and a set of losers, with a subset of (early)
losers excluded before the last round. The scenario is effectively the input to the
Alloy solver and the set of ballots is the output for a given model.
one sig Scenario {
losers: set Candidate,
winners: set Candidate,
eliminated: set Candidate, -- Candidates excluded before last round
threshold: Int, -- Minimum number of votes for funding
quota: Int, -- Minimum number of votes for election
fullQuota: Int -- Quota for full election
} {
// Mandatory pairs of outcomes: ties between winners and losers
all a: Candidate | some b: Candidate |
(a ·outcome = TiedLoser or a ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
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iff (b ·outcome = TiedWinner)
}
The following appended axioms require the winners and losers are disjoint, but
that eliminated is a subset of losers.
all c: Candidate | c in winners + losers
no c: Candidate | c in losers & winners
eliminated in losers
Now that the signatures are defined, the election outcomes can be given a more
formal definition.
7.1.6 Formal Definition of Election Outcomes
The formal definition of each Election Outcome is the set of axioms that reference
it. As an indication, the axioms for the AboveQuotaWinner are listed below:
all c: Candidate | (c ·outcome = AboveQuotaWinner) implies (
(Scenario ·quota < #c ·votes + #c ·transfers) and
(not Scenario ·quota < = #c ·votes) and
(#c ·surplus = #c ·votes + #c ·transfers - Scenario ·quota) and
(c ·surplus in c ·transfers) and
(#c ·wasted = 0))
The rest of the appended axioms can be found in appendix C.
The axioms represent rules expressed in electoral law, although in a more pre-
cise way. For example, the electoral law talks about elected, excluded and continu-
ing candidates, but does not explicitly talk about election outcomes. This contrasts
with the BON/JML specification and the ASM in which each state and transition
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can be referenced to a paragraph or subparagraph of electoral law. Therefore the
definition of an Election Outcome is somewhat arbitrary and alternative refine-
ments might have been possible.
7.2 Validation of the PR-STV Alloy Model
How then do we know if the axioms are complete and non-contradictory?
The internal consistency of the Alloy model is checked in two ways, using
Alloy assertions (lemmas) and Alloy predicates (scenarios). The axioms are re-
finements of explicit rules in the electoral law, whereas the implicit requirements
are stated as lemmas.
7.2.1 Lemmas
If the assertion contradicted the existing axioms, then the counter-example, from
the unsatisfiability core, was examined carefully, to see which axiom or lemma was
correct. This is one of the strengths of using the Alloy Analyzer.
For example, the following assertion requires that if one candidate won by tie
breaker, then another candidate must have lost by tie breaker, with an equal number
of votes and transfers2.
assert wellFormedTieBreaker {
some w,l : Candidate | (w in Scenario ·winners and
l in Scenario ·losers and #w ·votes = #l ·votes and
#w ·transfers = #l ·transfers) implies
w ·outcome = TiedWinner and
2Strictly it would require an equal number of votes and transfers on each round of counting, but
the model does not specify in which round the transfers were received
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(l ·outcome = TiedLoser or l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser) }
The next example of a lemma is an implicit rule that there cannot be more prefer-
ences than candidates:
assert lengthOfBallot {
all b: Ballot | Election ·method = STV implies
#b ·preferences < = #Candidate }
7.3 Automated Test Generation using Alloy Predicates
The question arises, how do we find witnesses for each distinct outcome, that is
how do we find the smallest set of test ballots required for each outcome, where
each outcome represents a distinct path through the algorithm.
These generated test cases are used to complement existing hand-written unit
tests. To accomplish this task, one needs to be able to generate the ballots in each
distinct kind of ballot box identified using the results of the earlier sections of this
paper. Effectively, the question is one of, “Given the election outcome R, what is
a legal set of ballots B that guarantees R holds?”
7.3.1 Generation of Ballot Boxes for Test Cases
Using the ie.votail.model.factory.ScenarioFactory class it is possible to enumerate
through all the possible thousands of combinations of Election Outcomes for a
given number of seats and a given number of candidates. Scenarios which contain
incompatible sets of outcomes, e.g. a CompromiseWinner with a TiedLoser, are
discarded.
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The remaining valid scenarios are then loaded one at a time as predicates into
the Alloy model. If a solution is not found for a small scope, then the predicate
is run with a larger scope. If no solution is found for a scope as large as 30, for
example, then it is noted in a log file for further investigation to confirm that the
scenario has no solution.
The solution space for each scenario is then parsed so as to extract the ballots
which are then saved into a test database.
This test database then forms the dataset for testing with RAC.
If all configurations are explored and the expected scenario matches the actual
results, then we know that the implementation correctly implements all branches
of the voting scheme’s specification. If some of the results are incorrect, then we
have found a bug in the ballot counting implementation, assuming that the model
is perfect. If code coverage is less than complete, but the model is complete, then
we have discovered hidden functionality (or dead code) in the system under test,
keeping in mind that the model is still an abstraction of the underlying software.
For example, the earliest version of the PR-STV model did not distinguish between
transferable and non-transferable surpluses.
The ElectoralScenario class contains an ordered sequence of Election Out-
comes e.g. one winner above quota, one compromise winner, two early losers etc.
7.3.2 Coverage Analysis
Beyond the issue of correctness, we can also analyze the completeness and effi-
ciency of the implementation. In particular, by running all validation tests while
measuring code coverage, we can discover:
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• which parts of the code are exercised most, and thus are the prime focus for
the application of verification technologies,
• which parts of the code are not exercised at all, and thus are dead code, or are
code representing misinterpretations of the voting scheme’s counting rules,
and
• if the system crashes, the inputs that were unexpected, which in turn tells us
about misinterpretations of the scheme
Results The test and coverage analysis can be seen in section 8.3.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
The most vulnerable part of the system is the link between the polling station and
the counting system, namely that candidate ID numbers could be swapped before
loading of the ballot data into the counting system. The twin defenses against such
an attack are an independent audit trail and homomorphic encryption of ballots
[31], which are outside the scope of this dissertation.
Therefore the correctness of the implementation cannot be guaranteed, but in-
stead a measure of the completeness of verification and validation is given.
However the use of lightweight formal methods remains a viable alternative
to code inspection and intensive manual testing of software. In particular, a test
strategy could be designed to focus on those parts of the system with less coverage
from the verification tools.
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8.1 Limitations
1992 Electoral Act, Section 121, subsection (8) There is one scenario which I
did not include in my model of PR-STV, the lowest continuing candidate can be
excluded before the distribution of a surplus, if that candidate already has enough
votes to reach the quarter-quota threshold, or if the surplus would not be enough to
make a difference.
8.2 Vulnerabilities
STV, without fractional counting, is subject to two forms of counting attack in ad-
dition to the ballot signing attack. 1 The first attack is to bias the shuffling of ballots
so that ballots with third and subsequent preferences for the chosen candidate are
closer to the top of the pile, and the second would be to bias the breaking of ties in
favor of a chosen candidate.
8.3 Results
Despite the use of a verification-centric process, and 100% statement coverage of
the code, the following issues are outstanding, representing a potential inconsis-
tency in the JML specifications.
1Ballot signing is possible when anonymized ballots are made available for third-party inspection
and counting. The lower preferences can be chosen in such a way as to identify the vote to a coercer.
The defense is either not to reveal the ballot data or only to reveal the higher preferences which were
exercised during the count [24].
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8.3.1 ESC Warnings
Figure 8.1 lists the unresolved ESC warnings in each class. These are assumed
to represent false negatives, unless confirmed by code inspection or by RAC, since
ESC/Java2 is not sound.
For example the Possible Negative Array Index warning on line 220 of Ab-
stractBallotCouting.java makes no sense given the precondition on line 212 which
restricts the index parameter to non-negative values.
The warning Code Not Checked means that the assumptions are inconsistent,
that the method might not terminate, or that the static analysis is imprecise. The
warning Method Not Checked means that the prover limit (maximum number of
verification conditions) was exceeded.
The number of lines of specification with unresolved ESC warnings in each
class, per statement are shown in figure 8.2 and methods with unresolved warnings
in figure 8.3. The count of specification methods includes Java methods with JML
specifications, and also JML model methods. Coverage refers to the percentage of
lines of specification, or methods of specification without unresolved warnings.
8.3.2 RAC failures
Figure 8.4 lists the unresolved RAC failures in each class. Unfortunately, the very
first failure was in the constructor of the main class, so it may be hiding other RAC
failures later on. 2. This first RAC failure does not appear when the same RAC
tests are run in debug mode using Eclipse, to discover which invariant had been
violated, thus revealing the other RAC errors.
2The RAC failures can be seen by running make cibuild on the command line, at the root of the
Vo´ta´il project.
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File Method Line Warning
AbstractBallotCounting.java isDepositSaved 220 Negative Array Index
AbstractBallotCounting.java setup 277 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java load 301 Object Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java allocateFirstPrefrences 347 Modifies Clause
AbstractBallotCounting.java countBallotsFor 370 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java countFirstPreferences 397 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java getPotentialTransfers 426 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java getNextContinuingPreference 464 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java load 308 Object Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java allocateFirstPreferences 342 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java allocateFirstPreferences 351 Postcondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java getNextContinuingPreference 464 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java isContinuingCandidateID 491 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java isContinuingCandidateID 497 Postcondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java getActualTransfers 551 Postcondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java getTransferShortfall 608 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java isHigherThan 713 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java compareCandidates 789 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting,java getTotalTransferableVotes 832 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java findHighestCandidate 891 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting,java findLowestCandidate 939 Loop Invariant
AbstractBallotCounting.java eliminateCandidate 986 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java redistributeBallots 1008 Null Reference
AbstractBallotCounting.java redistributeBallots 1009 Negative Array Index
AbstractBallotCounting.java transferBallot 1033 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.java electCandidate 1072 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.jml getSumOfTransfers 366 Null Reference
AbstractBallotCounting.jml getCandidateRanking 513 Array Index
AbstractBallotCounting.jml getCandidateRanking 518 Precondition
AbstractBallotCounting.jml numberTransferable 659 Null Reference
AbstractBallotCounting.jml getOrder 693 Null Reference
BallotBox.java accept 117 Precondition
Candidate.java addVote 195 Precondition
Candidate.java getCandidateRanking n/a Method Not Checked
Constituency.java setNumberOfCandidates 102 Code Not Checked
Figure 8.1: Extract from the list of unresolved ESC warnings
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Class Lines with Warnings Total Coverage %
AbstractBallotCounting 28 292 90
AbstractCountStatus 0 10 100
Ballot 0 23 100
BallotBox 1 23 96
BallotCounting 0 64 100
Candidate 1 71 99
Constituency 1 35 97
ElectionStatus 0 7 100
Total for election.tally package 31 534 94
Figure 8.2: Unresolved ESC warnings by line for each JML specification class
Class Methods with Warnings Total Coverage %
AbstractBallotCounting 26 54 50
Ballot 1 21 95
BallotBox 0 5 100
BallotCounting 0 19 100
Candidate 1 16 94
Constituency 1 8 87
AbstractCountStatus 0 4 100
ElectionStatus 0 3 100
election.tally package 29 130 78
Figure 8.3: Unresolved ESC warnings by method for each JML specification class
Java Source File Method Line Failures
BallotCounting Default Constructor 41 Object Invariant
BallotCounting removeNonTransferableBallots 126 Loop Invariant
BallotCounting incrementCountNumber 400 Postcondition
Constituency constructor 44 Object Invariant
Figure 8.4: Full List of RAC failures
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The number of lines of code with unresolved RAC failures in the each class are
shown in figure 8.5 and number of methods with unresolved RAC failures in figure
8.6. Four such failures are found, confirming the related ESC warnings.
Since there is no possibility of unsoundness in RAC, these failures indicate an
(as yet) undiscovered inconsistency in the formal specifications.
This is the major limitation of the methodology chosen, despite having suf-
ficient test cases and establishing the consistency of the Alloy model, there re-
mains the possibility of a subtle mistake in the JML specifications, such as over-
specification leading to false negatives.
Whereas Alloy predicates can be used to detect an over-specification, this can
be harder to do in JML. One technique that was used before implementing the
JML specification was to place assert false in each empty method body. Any such
method that passed would be shown to have an inconsistent specification. Although
this was done before implementation, it was clearly not sufficient.
At first glance, such an inconclusive result, might seem to undermine confi-
dence in both the specification and implementation of Vo´ta´il. Nevertheless each of
the RAC failures can be shown to be false negative by code inspection.
If the same test cases were to be used for black box testing of a third-party
implementation without a JML specification, and perhaps without source code,
then it would still be possible to check the expected result for each set of test ballots
as well as the overall code coverage. The main limitation of this approach is that the
generated test ballots were stored in Vo´ta´il specific format, rather than a standard
format such as the Election Markup Language (EML) [69] which considerably
increases the amount of software engineering effort required to test each system.
Nevertheless, in principle, there is now a complete set of test data, suitable for
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Class Lines with Failures Total Coverage %
AbstractBallotCounting 0 306 100
AbstractCountStatus 0 20 100
Ballot 0 52 100
BallotBox 0 29 100
BallotCounting 3 191 98
Candidate 0 81 100
Constituency.java 1 47 98
CandidateStatus.java 0 7 100
CountConfiguration 0 5 100
ElectionStatus.java 0 11 100
election.tally package 4 749 99
Figure 8.5: Unresolved RAC failures by line for each Java class
testing any PR-STV implementation, and more importantly a means of updating
the model behind this data and regenerating the test data, if required.
Vo´ta´il also offers a large and interesting JML specification against which new
JML tools can be deployed and tested, knowing that there are potential specifica-
tion errors waiting to be discovered.
8.4 Contribution
This is the first complete formal specification of the Irish PR-STV ballot counting
procedure. The requirements are traceable from the legislation, through BON and
JML to the Java code. The specifications and source code are publicly available for
comment and criticism. There are no other publicly available works of this kind.
PR-STV is one of the most complex voting systems in use today, particularly
with regards to formal specification and verification. It is also one of the most
complex which can be implemented and understood using paper ballots.
Counting of ballots is only one facet of the entire process, but is a critical
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Class RAC Failed Methods Total Coverage %
AbstractBallotCounting 0 34 100
BallotCounting 3 19 84
Candidate 0 14 100
Ballot 0 9 100
Constituency 1 8 87
BallotBox 0 5 100
CountConfiguration n/a 0 n/a
ElectionStatus n/a 0 n/a
CandidateStatus n/a 0 n/a
AbstractCountStatus 0 1 100
election.tally package 4 90 96
Figure 8.6: Unresolved RAC failures by method for each Java class
component.
Even in simple first-past-the-post counting it is not uncommon to discover com-
puter tally errors, for example in the spreadsheets used for the Maine Caucus3. If
this is the case for simple plurality voting, the scope for errors in PR-STV are even
greater.
There appears to be no valid reason why a software system for counting of
votes should contain any errors whatever, provided the software has been rigor-
ously verified, and also installed in a secure tamper-proof manner in the machines.
Finally, a discrepancy between the paper count and electronic count does not
always mean that the electronic count is wrong.
3http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/show.cgi?8/81922
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"Standard built-in and primitive classes reusable in all BON designs"
class BOOLEAN description "A binary true or false value"
class NATURAL_NUMBER description "Non-negative whole number"
class REAL_NUMBER description "Any measurable value"
class STRING description "A sequence of text characters"
class SET description "A collection of objects of the same type"




proposed_refinement: "java ·lang ·Boolean"
explanation
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class_chart NATURAL_NUMBER
explanation
"Any non-negative whole number"
inherit VALUE
query
"What is my value?",
"Is my value higher than another natural number?",
"Is my value equal to another natural number?"
command
"Change my value to this natural number"
constraint
"My initial value is zero",
"My value is greater than or equal to zero",









"Collection of objects of the same type"
end
class_chart STRING
explanation "Sequence of text characters"
end




"A verified verifiable open source system for remote
electronic or computer mediated voting"
cluster COUNTING_PROCESS description "The counting of






"The counting of electronic ballots"
class BALLOT description
"Ranked list of candidates"
class BALLOT_BOX description
"The set of all valid ballots"
class BALLOT_COUNTING description
"The algorithm used to count the ballots"
class CANDIDATE description
"A person eligible and nominated for election"
class CONSTITUENCY description
"The location and size of the election"
end
A.4 Class Charts
-- Votail is designed to be used as a
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-- sub-system for counting within
-- either an optical ballot scan system
-- or a remote online voting system
-- that supplies a valid set of ballots
-- to be counted and that takes care of
-- system level issues such as security,
-- authentication and data storage ·
class_chart BALLOT
explanation
"A valid set of preferences such as an
ordered list of candidates"
query
"How many preferences are shown on this ballot?",
"Who is the first preference for?",
"Who is the next preference for?",
"Who is the highest preference continuing
candidate on this ballot?",
"Which elected or continuing candidate benefits
from this ballot?"
command
"Allocate this ballot to the next preference candidate"
constraint
"The sequence of preferences is unbroken e ·g ·




"The set of all ballot papers with at least one valid preference"
query
"How many valid ballot papers?",
"How many first preference votes for each candidate?",
A.4. CLASS CHARTS 101
"How many different piles of ballots?"
constraint
"Every ballot paper has at least one preference",
"The total number of first preference votes is equal to the
total number of non-spoilt ballots",
"The sum of the number of ballots in each pile is equal to the




"Count algorithm for tallying of the votes in Dail elections"
query
"How many continuing candidates?",
"How many remaining seats?",
"What is the quota?",
"Who is/are highest continuing candidate(s) with a surplus?",
"What is the surplus?",
"What is the transfer factor?"
command
"Distribute the surplus ballots",
"Select lowest continuing candidates for exclusion",





"A person eligible and nominated for election"
query
"How many first preferences?",
"How many second preferences?",
"How many votes in each round?"




"The overall parameters of the election"
query
"How many candidates in this election?",
"How many seats are in this constituency?",
"How many seats are being filled in this election?"
constraint
"At least one seat is being filled",
"The number of seats being filled is not
more than the number of
seats in this constituency",
"The number of seats being filled is




"A set of candidate outcomes"
command




"The complete set of all scenarios"
command
"Replay from a stored file"
"Write to a stored file"
end
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A.5 Event Chart



























"J: The lowest continuing candidate is selected for exclusion"
involves
BALLOT_COUNTING
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event

























"Scenarios for ballot counting"
scenario
"01: READY_TO_START"
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description
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"There is one remaining seat and at least two continuing
candidates, or the number of continuing candidates is just












"The number of continuing candidates equals the




"The number of continuing candidates equals the number





B.1 Abstract Ballot Counting Class
package election ·tally;
/∗ ∗
∗ This is a Java Modeling Language (JML) design specification of the ballot
∗ counting algorithm for elections to Dail Eireann - the lower house of the
∗ National Parliament of Ireland ·
∗
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·irishstatutebook ·ie/1992_23 ·html"> Part XIX of
∗ the Electoral Act, 1992< /a>
∗ @see Requirements for this specification are taken from
∗ < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf"> Department of
∗ Environment and Local Government, Commentary on Count
∗ Rules, sections 3-16, pages 12-65< /a>
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·jmlspecs ·org/"> JML Homepage< /a>
∗/
public abstract class AbstractBallotCounting extends ElectionStatus {
/∗ ∗ List of details for each candidate ·
∗ There are no duplicates in the list of candidate IDs and,
∗ once the counting starts, there must be a ballot paper associated with
∗ each vote held by a candidate · ∗/
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public invariant (PRECOUNT < state) implies
\nonnullelements (candidateList);
public model Candidate[] candidateList;
public invariant (PRELOAD < = state) implies
(candidateList #= null) &&
(\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
candidateList[i] #= null);
public invariant (PRELOAD < = state) implies
(totalCandidates == candidateList ·length);
public invariant (state == PRELOAD || state == LOADING) implies
(\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
candidateList[i] ·getStatus() == Candidate ·CONTINUING &&
candidateList[i] ·getTotalVote() == 0);
public invariant (state == PRELOAD || state == LOADING ||
state == PRECOUNT || state == COUNTING || state == FINISHED) implies
(\forall int i, j; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates &&
i < j && j < totalCandidates;
candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID() #=
candidateList[j] ·getCandidateID());
protected invariant (state == COUNTING || state == FINISHED) implies
(\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
candidateList[i] ·getTotalAtCount() ==
countBallotsFor (candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID()));
/∗ ∗ List of contents of each ballot paper that will be counted · ∗/
public model non_null election ·tally ·Ballot[] ballotsToCount;
/∗ ∗ Total number of candidates for election ∗/
public model int totalCandidates;
public invariant 0 < = totalCandidates;
public invariant (PRECOUNT < = state) implies
totalCandidates < = candidateList ·length;
public invariant numberElected + numberEliminated < = totalCandidates;
/∗ ∗ Number of candidates elected so far ∗/
public model int numberElected;
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public invariant 0 < = numberElected;
public invariant numberElected < = seats;
public invariant (state < = PRECOUNT) implies numberElected == 0;
protected invariant (COUNTING < = state) implies
numberElected == (\num_of int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
isElected(candidateList[i]));
public invariant (state == FINISHED) implies numberElected == seats;
public constraint \old(numberElected) < = numberElected;
/∗ ∗ Number of candidates excluded from election so far ∗/
public model int numberEliminated;
public invariant 0 < = numberEliminated;
public invariant (PRECOUNT < = state) implies
seats + numberEliminated < = totalCandidates;
public invariant (state == COUNTING || state == FINISHED) implies
numberEliminated == (\num_of int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
candidateList[i] ·getStatus() == Candidate ·ELIMINATED);
/∗ ∗ Number of seats to be filled in this election ∗/
public model int seats;
public invariant 0 < = seats;
public invariant seats < = totalSeats;
public constraint (PRELOAD < state) implies seats == \old (seats);
public invariant (state == COUNTING) implies (1 < = seats);
/∗ ∗ Total number of seats in this constituency ·
∗ The constitution and laws of Ireland do not allow less than three or
∗ more than five seats in each Dail constituency, but this could change in
∗ future and is not an essential part of the specification ·
∗/
public model int totalSeats;
public invariant 0 < = totalSeats;
public constraint (LOADING < = state) implies totalSeats == \old (totalSeats);
/∗ ∗ Total number of valid votes in this election count
∗ There is a theoretical maximum number of votes because there
∗ must be at least one seat for every thirty thousand electors, and
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∗ therefore a current maximum of 150,000 votes in a five seater
∗ constituency · The Java primitive type < code> int< /code> has a
∗ maximum value of over two billion which should be sufficient for
∗ anything less than a worldwide election ·
∗/
public model int totalVotes;
public invariant 0 < = totalVotes;
public invariant (LOADING < state) implies
(totalVotes == ballotsToCount ·length);
public invariant (state < LOADING) implies totalVotes == 0;
public constraint (state == LOADING) implies
(\old (totalVotes) < = totalVotes);
public constraint (LOADING < state) implies
(totalVotes == \old (totalVotes));
/∗ ∗ Minimum number of votes needed to save deposit unless elected ∗/
public model int depositSavingThreshold;
public invariant 0 < = depositSavingThreshold;
public invariant depositSavingThreshold < = totalVotes;
/∗ ∗ @see requirement 6, section 3, item 3, page 13 ∗/
invariant (PRECOUNT < state) implies
(depositSavingThreshold == ((getQuota() / 4) + 1));
/∗ ∗ Number of rounds of counting so far ∗/
public model int countNumber;
public initially countNumber == 0;
public invariant 0 < = countNumber;
public invariant (PRELOAD < = state) implies
countNumber < = CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
public constraint (state == COUNTING) implies
\old(countNumber) < = countNumber;
/∗ ∗ Number of seats that remain to be filled ∗/
public model int remainingSeats;
public invariant 0 < = remainingSeats;
public invariant remainingSeats < = seats;
public invariant (state < = PRECOUNT) implies
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remainingSeats == seats;
public invariant (state == FINISHED) implies
remainingSeats == 0;
public invariant (state == COUNTING) implies
remainingSeats == (seats - numberElected);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine if the candidate has received enough votes for election
∗
∗ @param candidate This candidate
∗ @return True if the candidate has at least a quota of votes
∗ @see "http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_1 ·pdf, page 79, paragraph 120 (2)"
∗/
ensures \result == (countBallotsFor(candidate ·getCandidateID()) ≥
getQuota());
public pure boolean hasQuota (election ·tally ·Candidate candidate);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine if the candidate has been elected
∗
∗ It is possible for a candidate without having reached the quota
∗ to be elected in the final round of counting by virtue of being the
∗ highest continuing candidate when one seat remains ·
∗
∗ @see requirement 4, section 13, item 3, page 13
∗
∗
∗ The quota is the minimum number of votes needed for election, except
∗ when any of the following shortcuts apply ·
∗ < ul>
∗ < li> The number of continuing candidates is equal to the number of remaining
∗ seats ·
∗ < li> The number of continuing candidates is one more than the number of
∗ remaining seats ·
∗ < li> There is one remaining seat ·
∗ < /ul>
∗
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∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_1 ·pdf">
∗ Department of Environment and Local Government,
∗ Electronic Vote Counting System, Appendix E< /a>
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf">
∗ Department of Environment and Local Government,
∗ Count Requirements and Commentary on Count Rules, sections 3-14< /a>
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·irishstatutebook ·ie/1992_23 ·html">
∗ Sections 48, 118 and 124 of the Electoral Act, 1992< /a>
∗
∗ @param candidate This candidate
∗ @return True if the candidate has been elected
∗/
requires candidate #= null;
requires countNumber ≥ 1;
requires state == COUNTING;
ensures (\result == ((candidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·ELECTED ||
hasQuota(candidate)));
public pure boolean isElected (election ·tally ·Candidate candidate);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine how many surplus votes a candidate has ·
∗
∗ The surplus is the maximum number of votes available for transfer
∗ @see requirement 5, section 3, item 3, page 13
∗
∗ @param candidate The candidate record
∗ @return The undistributed surplus for that candidate, or zero if the
∗ candidate has less than a quota of votes
∗/
public pure int getSurplus (election ·tally ·Candidate candidate);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determines if a candidate has saved his or her deposit ·
∗
∗ The deposit saving threshold is one plus one quarter of the
∗ full quota · It is possible for a candidate without the deposit
∗ saving threshold to be elected in the final round of counting by
B.1. ABSTRACT BALLOT COUNTING CLASS 113
∗ virtue of being the highest continuing candidate when one seat
∗ remains · This could happen, for example, if the majority of ballots
∗ contained only first preferences ·
∗
∗ @see requirement 7, section 13, item 3, page 13
∗
∗ @param candidate This candidate
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if candidate has had enough votes to
∗ save deposit or has been elected
∗/
requires (state == COUNTING) || (state == FINISHED);
ensures \result ==
((candidateList[index] ·getTotalVote() ≥ depositSavingThreshold) ||
(isElected (candidateList[index]) == true));
public pure boolean isDepositSaved (int index);
/∗ ∗
∗ Distribution of surplus votes
∗
∗ @param candidateWithSurplus The candidate whose surplus is to be distributed
∗ The highest surplus must be distributed if the total surplus
∗ could save the deposit of a candidate or change the relative position
∗ of the two lowest continuing candidates, or would be enough to elect the
∗ highest continuing candidate ·
∗ @see requirements 14-18, section 5, item 2, page 18
∗ @see requirement 8, section 4, item 2, page 15
∗/
requires isElected (candidateList[candidateWithSurplus])
&& getSurplus (candidateList[candidateWithSurplus]) > 0;
requires state == COUNTING;
requires getNumberContinuing() > remainingSeats;
ensures getSurplus (candidateList[candidateWithSurplus]) == 0;
public abstract void distributeSurplus(int candidateWithSurplus);
/∗ ∗
∗ Set up candidate details and number of seats
∗/
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requires state == EMPTY;
ensures state == PRELOAD;
ensures totalCandidates == constituency ·getNumberOfCandidates();
ensures seats == constituency ·getNumberOfSeatsInThisElection();
ensures totalSeats == constituency ·getTotalNumberOfSeats();
public void setup (Constituency constituency);
/∗ ∗ Loads all valid ballot papers ·
∗
∗ @param ballotBox The set of ballots for counting
∗
∗ All ballot papers must be assigned to a valid candidate ID
∗/
requires state == PRELOAD;
ensures state == PRECOUNT;
ensures totalVotes == ballotBox ·numberOfBallots;
ensures (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < totalVotes;
(\exists int j; 0 < = j && j < totalCandidates;
ballotsToCount[j] ·isAssignedTo(candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID())));
public void load(BallotBox ballotBox);
/∗ ∗
∗ Count the votes ·
∗
∗ This is the method that starts the counting process ·
∗ @see requirement 1, section 3, item 2, page 12
∗/
public normal_behavior
requires state == PRECOUNT || state == COUNTING;
assignable state, countNumber, numberElected, remainingSeats,
candidateList, ballotsToCount;
ensures remainingSeats == 0;
ensures numberElected == seats;
ensures state == FINISHED;
public abstract void count();
/∗ ∗
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∗ Get the status of the algorithm in progress
∗/
ensures \result == state;
public model pure byte getStatus();
/∗ ∗
∗ Gets the potential number of transfers from one candidate to another ·
∗
∗ This method is needed to get the proportions to use when transferring
∗ surplus votes · If the candidate was elected on the first count then all
∗ votes are examined, otherwise only the last set of votes received are
∗ examined ·
∗
∗ @see requirement 19, section 7, item 2, page 23
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate Candidate ID from which to check the transfers
∗ @param toCandidateID Candidate ID to check for receipt of transfered votes
∗ @return Number of votes potentially transferable from this candidate to that
∗ candidate
∗/
ensures \result== (\num_of int j; 0 < = j && j < totalVotes;
(ballotsToCount[j] ·isAssignedTo(fromCandidate ·getCandidateID())) &&
(getNextContinuingPreference(ballotsToCount[j]) == toCandidateID));
protected pure spec_public int getPotentialTransfers (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate, int toCandidateID);
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the maximum number of votes transferable to continuing candidates ·
∗
∗ @see requirement 20, section 7, item 2, page 24
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate Candidate from which to check the transfers
∗ @return Number of votes potentially transferable from this candidate
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
protected pure spec_public int getTotalTransferableVotes (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate);
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requires state == COUNTING;
public model pure int getSumOfTransfers(
non_null Candidate fromCandidate) {
int sum = 0;
loop_invariant (0 < i) implies
(sum == (\sum int j; 0 < = j && j < i;
getPotentialTransfers (fromCandidate,
candidateList[j] ·getCandidateID())));
for (int i=0; i < totalCandidates; i++ ) {






∗ Gets the next preference continuing candidate ·
∗
∗ This is the _nearest_ next preference i ·e ·
∗ filter the list of preferences to contain continuing candidates
∗ and then get the next preference to a continuing candidate,
∗ if any ·
∗
∗ @param ballot Ballot paper from which to get the next preference
∗
∗ @return Candidate ID of next continuing candidate or NONTRANSFERABLE
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
ensures (\result == Ballot ·NONTRANSFERABLE) ||
(\exists int k; 1 < = k && k < = ballot ·remainingPreferences();
\result == ballot ·getNextPreference(k));
ensures (isContinuingCandidateID(\result)) ||
(\result == Ballot ·NONTRANSFERABLE);
protected pure spec_public int getNextContinuingPreference
(non_null Ballot ballot);
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/∗ ∗
∗ Determine actual number of votes to transfer to this candidate, excluding
∗ rounding up of fractional transfers
∗
∗ @see requirement 21, section 7, item 3 ·1, page 24
∗ @see requirement 22, section 7, item 3 ·2, page 25
∗
∗ The votes in a surplus are transfered in proportion to
∗ the number of transfers available throughout the candidates ballot stack ·
∗ If not all transferable votes are accounted for the highest remainders
∗ for each continuing candidate need to be examined ·
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate Candidate from which to count the transfers
∗ @param toCandidate Continuing candidate eligible to receive votes
∗ @return Number of votes to be transfered, excluding fractional transfers
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
requires isElected (fromCandidate) ||
(fromCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·ELIMINATED);
requires toCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·CONTINUING;
ensures ((fromCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·ELECTED) &&
(getSurplus(fromCandidate) < getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate)))
implies (\result == (getSurplus (fromCandidate) ∗
getPotentialTransfers (fromCandidate, toCandidate ·getCandidateID()) /
getTotalTransferableVotes (fromCandidate)));
ensures ((fromCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·ELIMINATED) ||
(getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate) < = getSurplus (fromCandidate)))
implies (\result == (\num_of int j; 0 < = j && j < totalVotes;
ballotsToCount[j] ·isAssignedTo(fromCandidate ·getCandidateID()) &&
getNextContinuingPreference(ballotsToCount[j]) ==
toCandidate ·getCandidateID()));
protected pure spec_public int getActualTransfers (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate, non_null Candidate toCandidate);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine the rounded value of a fractional transfer ·
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∗
∗ This depends on the shortfall and the relative size of the
∗ other fractional transfers ·
∗
∗ @see requirements 23-25, section 7, item 3 ·2, page 25
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate
∗ Elected candidate from which to distribute surplus
∗
∗ @param toCandidate
∗ Continuing candidate potentially eligible to receive transfers
∗
∗ @return
∗ < code> 1< /code> if the fractional vote is to be rounded up
∗ < code> 0< /code> if the fractional vote is to be rounded down
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
requires isElected (fromCandidate);
requires toCandidate ·getStatus() == election ·tally ·Candidate ·CONTINUING;
requires getSurplus(fromCandidate) <
getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate);
ensures (getOrder (fromCandidate, toCandidate) < =
getTransferShortfall (fromCandidate)) implies \result == 1;
ensures (getOrder (fromCandidate, toCandidate) >
getTransferShortfall (fromCandidate)) implies \result == 0;
protected pure spec_public int getRoundedFractionalValue (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate, non_null Candidate toCandidate);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine the number of continuing candidates with a higher
∗ remainder in their transfer quotient, or deemed to have a higher
∗ remainder ·
∗
∗ There must be a strict ordering of candidates for the purpose of
∗ allocating the transfer shortfall · If two or more candidates have
∗ equal remainders then use the number of transfers they are about
∗ to receive and if the number of transfers are equal then look at the
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∗ number of votes already received ·
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate
∗ Elected candidate from which to distribute surplus
∗
∗ @param toCandidate
∗ Continuing candidate potentially eligible to receive transfers
∗
∗ @return The number of continuing candidates with a higher
∗ quotient remainder than this candidate
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
requires isElected (fromCandidate);
requires toCandidate ·getStatus() == CandidateStatus ·CONTINUING;
requires getSurplus(fromCandidate) <
getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate);
ensures \result == getCandidateRanking (fromCandidate, toCandidate);
protected pure spec_public int getOrder(
final non_null Candidate fromCandidate,
final non_null Candidate toCandidate);
ensures \result == (\num_of int i; i < = 0 && i < totalCandidates &&
candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID() #= toCandidate ·getCandidateID() &&












public pure model int getCandidateRanking (
Candidate fromCandidate, Candidate toCandidate) {
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int counter = 0;
for (int i=0; i < totalCandidates; i++ ) {
if (candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID() #=
toCandidate ·getCandidateID() &&
candidateList[i] ·getStatus() ==


















∗ Determine if one continuing candidate is higher than another,
∗ for the purpose of resolving remainders of transfer quotients ·
∗
∗ This is determined by finding the earliest round of counting in
∗ which these candidates had unequal votes · If both candidates
∗ are equal at all counts then random numbers are used to draw lots ·
∗
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf">
∗ Department of Environment and Local Government,
∗ Count Requirements and Commentary on Count Rules,
∗ section 7, page 25< /a>
∗
∗ @param firstCandidate
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∗ The first of the two candidates to be compared
∗
∗ @param secondCandidate
∗ The second of the two candidates to be compared
∗
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if first candidate is deemed to
∗ have received more votes than the second ·
∗/
requires firstCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·CONTINUING;
requires secondCandidate ·getStatus() == Candidate ·CONTINUING;
ensures \result == (\exists int i; 0 < = i && i < = countNumber;
(firstCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(i) > secondCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(i)) &&
(\forall int j; i < j && j < = countNumber;
firstCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(j) == secondCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(j))) ||
((randomSelection (firstCandidate, secondCandidate) ==
firstCandidate ·getCandidateID()) &&
(\forall int k; 0 < = k && k < = countNumber;
firstCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(k) == secondCandidate ·getVoteAtCount(k)));




∗ Draw lots to choose between two continuing candidates ·
∗
∗ The official guidelines suggest that the returning officer
∗ be asked to draw lots each time a random selection is required ·
∗ This is simulated by having random numbers assigned to the candidates,
∗ so that the process of drawing lots is repeatable for
∗ testing purposes · This means that the count results
∗ are deterministic for any given set of random numbers ·
∗
∗ Where fractional transfers are possible then there should be less need for
∗ this, especially when second and subsequent preferences are used in the
∗ event that two candidates receive an equal number of first preferences ·
∗
∗ @param firstCandidate
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∗ The first of the two candidates to be compared
∗
∗ @param secondCandidate
∗ The second of the two candidates to be compared
∗
∗ @return The candidate ID of the chosen candidate
∗/
ensures (\result == firstCandidate ·candidateID) iff
(firstCandidate ·isAfter(secondCandidate)
|| firstCandidate ·sameAs(secondCandidate));
ensures (\result == secondCandidate ·candidateID) iff
(secondCandidate ·isAfter(firstCandidate)
|| secondCandidate ·sameAs(firstCandidate));




∗ Determine the indivisible remainder after integer division
∗ by the transfer factor for surpluses ·
∗
∗ This can all be done with integer arithmetic; no need to use
∗ floating point numbers, which could introduce rounding errors ·
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate
∗ Elected candidate from which to count the transfers
∗ @param toCandidate Continuing candidate eligible to receive votes
∗
∗ @return The size of the quotient remainder
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
requires isElected (fromCandidate);
requires toCandidate ·getStatus() == election ·tally ·Candidate ·CONTINUING;
requires getSurplus(fromCandidate) <
getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate);
requires 0 < = getTransferShortfall (fromCandidate);
ensures \result ==
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getPotentialTransfers(fromCandidate, toCandidate ·getCandidateID()) -
getActualTransfers(fromCandidate, toCandidate);
protected pure spec_public int getTransferRemainder (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate, non_null Candidate toCandidate);
/∗ ∗




∗ Elected candidate from which to distribute surplus
∗
∗ @return The shortfall between the sum of the transfers and the size of surplus
∗/
protected normal_behavior
requires state == COUNTING;
requires isElected (fromCandidate);
requires getSurplus(fromCandidate) < getTotalTransferableVotes(fromCandidate);
protected pure spec_public int getTransferShortfall (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate);
requires state == COUNTING;
public pure model int numberTransferable (
non_null Candidate fromCandidate) {
int sum = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < = totalCandidates; i++ ) {






∗ Determine if a candidate ID belongs to a continuing candidate ·
∗
∗ @param candidateID
∗ The ID of candidate for which to check the status
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∗
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if this candidate ID matches that of a
∗ continuing candidate
∗/
requires 0 < candidateID;
ensures \result == (\exists int i; 0 < = i && i < totalCandidates;
candidateID == candidateList[i] ·getCandidateID() &&
candidateList[i] ·getStatus() == Candidate ·CONTINUING);
public /∗@ pure @∗/ boolean isContinuingCandidateID (int candidateID);
/∗ ∗
∗ List each candidate ID in order by random number to show how lots
∗ would have been chosen ·
∗
∗ @param candidate Candidate for which to get the order of
∗ @return Order of this candidate for use when lots are chosen
∗/
requires state == COUNTING || state == FINISHED;
protected pure model int getOrder(non_null Candidate candidate) {
int order = 1;
for (int c = 0; c < = totalCandidates; c++ ) {







∗ Transfer votes from one candidate to another ·
∗ @param fromCandidate Elected or excluded candidate
∗ @param toCandidate Continuing candidate
∗ @param numberOfVotes Number of votes to be transfered
∗/
requires fromCandidate ·getStatus() #= CandidateStatus ·CONTINUING;
requires toCandidate ·getStatus() == CandidateStatus ·CONTINUING;
ensures countBallotsFor(fromCandidate ·getCandidateID()) ==
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\old (countBallotsFor(fromCandidate ·getCandidateID())) - numberOfVotes;
ensures countBallotsFor(toCandidate ·getCandidateID()) ==
\old (countBallotsFor(toCandidate ·getCandidateID())) +
numberOfVotes;
public abstract void transferVotes(
final Candidate fromCandidate,
final non_null Candidate toCandidate,
final int numberOfVotes);
/∗ ∗
∗ Count the number of ballots in the pile for this candidate ·
∗
∗ @param candidateID The internal identifier of this candidate
∗ @return The number of ballots in this candidate’s pile
∗/
public pure int countBallotsFor(int candidateID);
/∗ ∗ Number of votes needed to guarantee election ∗/
requires 0 < = seats;
ensures \result == 1 + (totalVotes / (seats + 1));
public pure int getQuota();
/∗ ∗ Number of candidates neither elected nor excluded from election
∗ There must be at least one continuing candidate for each remaining seat
∗ @see requirement 11, section 4, item 4, page 16
∗/
ensures 0 < = \result;
ensures \result == totalCandidates - (numberElected + numberEliminated);
public pure int getNumberContinuing();
}
B.2 Ballot Counting Class
public class BallotCounting extends AbstractBallotCounting {
/∗ ∗ Inner ASM ∗/
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public non_null CountStatus countStatus;
/∗ ∗
∗ Distribute the surplus of an elected candidate ·
∗
∗ @param winner
∗ The elected candidate
∗/
also
requires state == COUNTING;
requires countStatus ·getState() ==
AbstractCountStatus ·SURPLUS_AVAILABLE;
requires isElected (candidateList[winner]);
requires 0 < = winner && winner < candidateList ·length;
public void distributeSurplus(final int winner);
/∗ ∗
∗ Move surplus ballots from a winner’s stack to another





requires 0 < = index && index < candidateList ·length;
requires 0 < = winner && winner < candidateList ·length;
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
protected void moveSurplusBallots(final int winner,
final int index);
requires 0 < = winner && winner < candidateList ·length;
requires state == COUNTING;
protected void removeNonTransferableBallots(final int winner,
final int surplus, final int totalTransferableVotes);
requires 0 < = index && index < candidateList ·length;
requires 0 < = winner && winner < candidateList ·length;
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
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protected int calculateNumberOfTransfers(final int winner, final int index);
/∗ ∗
∗ Transfer votes from one Dail candidate to another ·
∗
∗ @param fromCandidate
∗ The elected or excluded candidate from which to transfer votes
∗ @param toCandidate
∗ The continuing candidate to receive the transferred votes
∗ @param numberOfVotes
∗ The number of votes to be transferred
∗/
also
requires state == COUNTING;
requires countStatus ·getState() == AbstractCountStatus ·READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS;
public void transferVotes(final Candidate fromCandidate,
final non_null Candidate toCandidate, final int numberOfVotes);
/∗ ∗
∗ Count the ballots for this constituency using the rules of proportional
∗ representation by single transferable vote ·
∗
∗ @see "requirement 1, section 3, item 2, page 12"
∗/
also
requires state == PRECOUNT || state == COUNTING;
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
assignable countNumberValue, ballotsToCount, candidateList[∗];
assignable candidates, candidates[∗];
assignable totalRemainingSeats, countStatus;






ensures state == ElectionStatus ·FINISHED;
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public void count();
/∗ ∗
∗ Elect any candidate with a quota or more of votes ·
∗/
requires state == COUNTING;
assignable candidateList, ballotsToCount, candidates,
numberOfCandidatesElected, totalRemainingSeats, countStatus;
ensures countStatus ·substate == AbstractCountStatus ·CANDIDATE_ELECTED ||
countStatus ·substate == AbstractCountStatus ·SURPLUS_AVAILABLE;
protected void electCandidatesWithSurplus();
/∗ ∗
∗ Indicates if there are any continuing candidates with at least a quota
∗ of votes; these candidates are ready to be deemed elected by quota ·
∗
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if there exists a continuing candidate
∗ who has quota of votes
∗/
requires PRECOUNT < = state;
ensures \result == (\exists int i; 0 < = i &&
i < totalNumberOfCandidates;
(candidates[i] ·getStatus() == CandidateStatus ·CONTINUING)
&& hasQuota(candidates[i]));
protected/∗@ pure @∗/boolean candidatesWithQuota();
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
assignable countStatus, countNumberValue, candidates, candidateList;




∗ As the number of remaining seats equals the number of continuing
∗ candidates, all continuing candidates are deemed to be elected without
∗ reaching the quota ·
∗/
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requires candidateList #= null;
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
requires getContinuingCandidates() == totalRemainingSeats;
requires countStatus #= null;
assignable candidateList[∗], countNumber, countNumberValue;
assignable numberOfCandidatesElected, totalRemainingSeats;
assignable candidates;
ensures 0 == totalRemainingSeats;
protected void fillLastSeats();
requires state == PRECOUNT;
assignable state, countStatus, countStatus ·substate, countNumberValue,
totalRemainingSeats, savingThreshold, numberOfCandidatesElected,
numberOfCandidatesEliminated;
ensures state == COUNTING;
public void startCounting();
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the number of votes required in order to recoup election expenses or
∗ qualify for funding in future elections ·
∗/
ensures \result == 1 + (getQuota() / 4);
public/∗@ pure @∗/int getDepositSavingThreshold();
requires state == COUNTING;
requires countStatus ·isPossibleState (countingStatus);
assignable countStatus, countStatus ·substate;
ensures countingStatus == countStatus ·getState();
public void updateCountStatus(final int countingStatus);
assignable countNumberValue;
ensures \old(countNumberValue) + 1 == countNumberValue;
public void incrementCountNumber();
ensures totalRemainingSeats == \result;
public model pure int getRemainingSeats() {
return totalRemainingSeats;
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}
ensures getNumberContinuing() == \result;
public model pure int getContinuingCandidates() {
return getNumberContinuing();
}
requires 0 < = index && index < candidates ·length;
ensures \result == candidates[index];
public pure Candidate getCandidate(final int index);
}
B.3 Abstract Count Status Class
package election ·tally;
public abstract class AbstractCountStatus {
// Internal states within the ballot counting machine
public static final int READY_TO_COUNT = 1;
public static final int NO_SEATS_FILLED_YET = 2;
public static final int CANDIDATES_HAVE_QUOTA = 3;
public static final int CANDIDATE_ELECTED = 4;
public static final int NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE = 5;
public static final int SURPLUS_AVAILABLE = 6;
public static final int READY_TO_ALLOCATE_SURPLUS = 7;
public static final int READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS = 8;
public static final int CANDIDATE_EXCLUDED = 9;
public static final int READY_FOR_NEXT_ROUND_OF_COUNTING = 10;
public static final int LAST_SEAT_BEING_FILLED = 11;
public static final int
MORE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATES_THAN_REMAINING_SEATS = 12;
public static final int ONE_OR_MORE_SEATS_REMAINING = 13;
public static final int
ONE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATE_PER_REMAINING_SEAT = 14;
public static final int ALL_SEATS_FILLED = 15;
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public static final int END_OF_COUNT = 16;
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the current stage of counting ·
∗/
ensures \result == substate;




∗ Move to the next stage of counting ·
∗
∗ @param newState
∗ The next stage of counting ·
∗/
requires isPossibleState (newState);
requires isTransition (getState(), newState);
assignable substate;
ensures getState() == newState;
public abstract void changeState(int newState);
protected/∗@ spec_public @∗/int substate;
/∗ ∗
∗ Confirm that this value is a valid stage of counting ·
∗
∗ @param value
∗ The stage in the counting process ·
∗/
ensures \result ==
((READY_TO_COUNT == value) ||
(NO_SEATS_FILLED_YET == value) ||
(CANDIDATES_HAVE_QUOTA == value) ||
(CANDIDATE_ELECTED == value) ||
(NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == value) ||
(SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == value) ||
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(READY_TO_ALLOCATE_SURPLUS == value) ||
(READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS == value) ||
(CANDIDATE_EXCLUDED == value) ||
(READY_FOR_NEXT_ROUND_OF_COUNTING == value) ||
(LAST_SEAT_BEING_FILLED == value) ||
(MORE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATES_THAN_REMAINING_SEATS == value) ||
(ONE_OR_MORE_SEATS_REMAINING == value) ||
(ALL_SEATS_FILLED == value) ||
(END_OF_COUNT == value) ||
(ONE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATE_PER_REMAINING_SEAT == value));
public model pure boolean isPossibleState(int value) {
return ((READY_TO_COUNT == value)
|| (NO_SEATS_FILLED_YET == value)
|| (CANDIDATES_HAVE_QUOTA == value)
|| (CANDIDATE_ELECTED == value)
|| (NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == value)
|| (SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == value)
|| (READY_TO_ALLOCATE_SURPLUS == value)
|| (READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS == value)
|| (CANDIDATE_EXCLUDED == value)
|| (READY_FOR_NEXT_ROUND_OF_COUNTING == value)
|| (LAST_SEAT_BEING_FILLED == value)
|| (MORE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATES_THAN_REMAINING_SEATS == value)
|| (ONE_OR_MORE_SEATS_REMAINING == value)
|| (ALL_SEATS_FILLED == value)
|| (END_OF_COUNT == value)
|| (ONE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATE_PER_REMAINING_SEAT == value));
}
/∗ ∗
∗ Confirm that this is a valid transition from one stage of counting
∗ to another ·
∗
∗ @param fromState The current stage of counting ·
∗ @param toState The next stage if counting ·
∗/
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requires isPossibleState(fromState);
requires isPossibleState(toState);
public model pure boolean isTransition (int fromState, int toState) {
// Self transitions are allowed
if (toState == fromState) {
return true;
}
// No transitions into the initial state
else if (READY_TO_COUNT == toState) {
return false;
}
// No transitions away from final state
else if (END_OF_COUNT == fromState) {
return false;
}
// Transition: Calculate Quota
else if ((READY_TO_COUNT == fromState) && (NO_SEATS_FILLED_YET == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Find Highest Continuing Candidate with Quota
else if (((NO_SEATS_FILLED_YET == fromState) ||
(CANDIDATES_HAVE_QUOTA == fromState) ||
(MORE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATES_THAN_REMAINING_SEATS == fromState)) &&
((CANDIDATE_ELECTED == toState) ||
(NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == toState))) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Calculate Surplus
else if ((CANDIDATE_ELECTED == fromState) &&
((CANDIDATES_HAVE_QUOTA == toState) ||
(SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == toState) ||
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(NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == toState))) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Calculate Number of Votes to Transfer
else if ((SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == fromState) &&
(READY_TO_ALLOCATE_SURPLUS == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Calculate Transfers from Surplus
else if ((READY_TO_ALLOCATE_SURPLUS == fromState) &&
(READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Calculate Transfers from Excluded Candidate
else if ((CANDIDATE_EXCLUDED == fromState) &&
(READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Move the Ballots
else if ((READY_TO_MOVE_BALLOTS == fromState) &&
(READY_FOR_NEXT_ROUND_OF_COUNTING == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Select Lowest Continuing Candidates for Exclusion
else if ((NO_SURPLUS_AVAILABLE == fromState) ||
(CANDIDATE_EXCLUDED == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Count Continuing Candidates
else if ((ONE_OR_MORE_SEATS_REMAINING == fromState) &&
((LAST_SEAT_BEING_FILLED == toState) ||
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(MORE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATES_THAN_REMAINING_SEATS == toState) ||
(ONE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATE_PER_REMAINING_SEAT == toState))) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Check Remaining Seats
else if ((READY_FOR_NEXT_ROUND_OF_COUNTING == fromState) &&
((ONE_OR_MORE_SEATS_REMAINING == toState) ||
(ALL_SEATS_FILLED == toState))) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Declare Remaining Candidates Elected
else if ((ONE_CONTINUING_CANDIDATE_PER_REMAINING_SEAT == fromState) &&
(ALL_SEATS_FILLED == toState)) {
return true;
}
// Transition: Close the Count
else if ((ALL_SEATS_FILLED == fromState) &&
(END_OF_COUNT == toState)) {
return true;
}







∗ The Ballot class represents a ballot paper in an Irish election,
∗ which uses the Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote
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∗ (PRSTV) system ·
∗
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf"> Department of
∗ Environment and Local Government, Count Requirements and
∗ Commentary on Count Rules, sections 3-14< /a>
∗/
public class Ballot {
/∗ ∗
∗ Candidate ID value to use for nontransferable ballot papers ·
∗
∗ A special candidate ID value is used to indicate
∗ non-transferable votes i ·e ·, when the list of preferences has
∗ been exhausted and none of the continuing candidates are in the
∗ preference list, then the ballot is deemed to be nontransferable ·
∗
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf">
∗ Department of Environment and Local Government,
∗ Count Requirements and Commentary on Count Rules,
∗ section 7, pages 23-27< /a>
∗/
public static final int NONTRANSFERABLE;
/∗ ∗ Preference list of candidate IDs ∗/
protected spec_public non_null int[] preferenceList;
/∗ ∗ Total number of valid preferences on the ballot paper ∗/
public invariant 0 < = numberOfPreferences;
// numberOfPreferences == 0 means an empty ballot ·
protected spec_public int numberOfPreferences;
/∗ ∗ Position within preference list ∗/
public initially positionInList == 0;
public invariant 0 < = positionInList;
public invariant positionInList < = numberOfPreferences;
public constraint \old(positionInList) < = positionInList;
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ensures numberOfPreferences == preferenceList ·length;
ensures positionInList == 0;
public Ballot(final /∗@ non_null @∗/ int[] preferences);
/∗ ∗
∗ Gets remaining number of preferences ·
∗
∗ @return The number of preferences remaining
∗/
public normal_behavior
requires positionInList < = numberOfPreferences;
ensures \result == numberOfPreferences - positionInList;
public pure int remainingPreferences();
}
B.5 Ballot Box Class
package election ·tally;
/∗ ∗ Data transfer structure for set of all valid ballots ∗/
public class BallotBox {
/∗ ∗
∗ List of valid ballot papers, already shuffled
∗ and mixed by the data loader
∗ or returning officer ·
∗/
invariant ballots ·length < = Ballot ·MAX_BALLOTS;
invariant (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < numberOfBallots;
ballots[i] #= null);
protected non_null spec_public Ballot[] ballots;
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/∗ ∗
∗ Get the number of ballots in this box ·
∗
∗ @return the number of ballots in this ballot box
∗/
public normal_behavior
ensures 0 < = \result;
ensures \result == numberOfBallots;
ensures (ballots == null) implies \result == 0;
public pure int size();
/∗ ∗
∗ The total number of ballots in this ballot box ·
∗/
public invariant 0 < = numberOfBallots;
public invariant numberOfBallots < = Ballot ·MAX_BALLOTS;
public invariant numberOfBallots < = ballots ·length;
public constraint \old (numberOfBallots) < = numberOfBallots;
protected spec_public int numberOfBallots;
public ghost int lastBallotAdded = 0;
/∗ ∗
∗ Number of ballots copied from box
∗/
public initially index == 0;
public invariant index < = size();
public constraint \old(index) < = index;
protected spec_public transient int index;
/∗ ∗
∗ Create an empty ballot box ·
∗/
assignable index, numberOfBallots, ballots;
public BallotBox();
/∗ ∗
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∗ Accept an anonymous ballot paper ·
∗




∗ The list of candidate preferences
∗/
public normal_behavior
requires numberOfBallots < ballots ·length;
requires numberOfBallots < Ballot ·MAX_BALLOTS;
requires (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < preferences ·length;
preferences[i] #= Ballot ·NONTRANSFERABLE &&
preferences[i] #= Candidate ·NO_CANDIDATE);
assignable ballots, numberOfBallots, ballots[∗], lastBallotAdded;
ensures \old(numberOfBallots) + 1 == numberOfBallots;
ensures ballots[lastBallotAdded] #= null;
public void accept(final non_null int[] preferences);
/∗ ∗
∗ Is there another ballot paper?
∗
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if there is another ballot in the box
∗/
ensures \result == (index < numberOfBallots);
public/∗@ pure @∗/boolean isNextBallot();
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the next ballot paper
∗
∗ @return The ballot paper
∗/
requires 0 < = index;
requires isNextBallot();
requires index + 1 < ballots ·length;
assignable index;
ensures \result == ballots[\old(index)];
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∗ The Candidate object records the number of votes received during
∗ each round of counting · Votes can only be added to the
∗ candidate’s stack while the
∗ candidate has a status of < code> CONTINUING< /code> ·
∗
∗ @see < a href="http://www ·cev ·ie/htm/tenders/pdf/1_2 ·pdf">
∗ Department of Environment and Local Government,
∗ Count Requirements and Commentary on
∗ Count Rules, section 3-14< /a>
∗/
public class Candidate extends CandidateStatus {
/∗ ∗
∗ Maximum expected number of candidates in any one constituency ·
∗/
public static final int MAX_CANDIDATES = 50;
/∗ ∗
∗ Identifier for the candidate · The data should be loaded in
∗ such a way that the assignment of candidate IDs is fair and
∗ unbiased ·
∗/
public invariant 0 < = candidateID;
public constraint \old(candidateID) #= NO_CANDIDATE
implies candidateID == \old(candidateID);
protected transient spec_public int candidateID;
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/∗ ∗ Number of votes added at each count ∗/
public invariant (\forall int i; 0 < i && i < votesAdded ·length;
0 < = votesAdded[i]);
public initially (\forall int i; 0 < i && i < votesAdded ·length;
votesAdded[i] == 0);
public invariant votesAdded ·length < = CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
protected/∗@ spec_public non_null @∗/int[] votesAdded =
new int[CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT];
/∗ ∗ Number of votes removed at each count ∗/
public invariant (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < votesRemoved ·length;
0 < = votesRemoved[i]);
public initially (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < votesRemoved ·length;
votesRemoved[i] == 0);
public invariant votesRemoved ·length
< = CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
protected/∗@ spec_public non_null @∗/int[] votesRemoved =
new int[CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT];
public invariant votesAdded #= votesRemoved;
public invariant votesRemoved #= votesAdded;
/∗ ∗ The number of rounds of counting so far ∗/
public invariant 0 < = lastCountNumber;
public initially lastCountNumber == 0;
public constraint \old(lastCountNumber) < = lastCountNumber;
public invariant lastCountNumber < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
public invariant lastCountNumber < votesAdded ·length;
public invariant lastCountNumber < votesRemoved ·length;
protected spec_public int lastCountNumber = 0;
protected initially totalVote == 0;
protected constraint \old(totalVote) < = totalVote;
protected spec_public int totalVote = 0;
/∗ ∗ Number of ballots transferred to another candidate∗/
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protected initially removedVote == 0;
protected invariant removedVote < = totalVote;
protected constraint \old(removedVote) < = removedVote;
protected invariant (state == CONTINUING)
implies removedVote == 0;
protected spec_public int removedVote = 0;
public static final int NO_CANDIDATE = Ballot ·NONTRANSFERABLE;
/∗ ∗
∗ Next available value for candidate ID number ·
∗/
private constraint \old(nextCandidateID) < = nextCandidateID;
private spec_public static int nextCandidateID = MAX_CANDIDATES +
1;
/∗ ∗
∗ Gets number of votes added or removed in this round of counting ·
∗
∗ @param count
∗ This count number
∗ @return A positive number if the candidate received transfers
∗ or a negative number if the candidate’s surplus was
∗ distributed or the candidate was eliminated and votes
∗ transfered to another ·
∗/
protected normal_behavior
requires 0 < = count;
requires count < votesAdded ·length;
requires count < votesRemoved ·length;
ensures \result == votesAdded[count] - votesRemoved[count];
protected/∗@ pure spec_public @∗/int getVoteAtCount(final int count);
/∗ ∗
∗ Total number of votes received by or added to this candidate ·
∗
∗ @return Gross total of votes received
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∗/
ensures \result == totalVote;
public/∗@ pure @∗/int getTotalVote();
/∗ ∗
∗ Get status at the current round of counting; {@link #ELECTED},
∗ {@link #ELIMINATED} or {@link #CONTINUING}
∗
∗ @return State value for this candidate
∗/
public normal_behavior
ensures \result == state;
public pure byte getStatus();
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the unique ID of this candidate ·
∗
∗ @return The candidate ID number
∗/
public normal_behavior
ensures \result == candidateID;
public pure int getCandidateID();
/∗ ∗





requires 0 < theCandidateID;
assignable candidateID, votesAdded, votesRemoved;
ensures this ·candidateID == theCandidateID;
ensures (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
getTotalAtCount() == 0);
public Candidate(final int theCandidateID);
/∗ ∗
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∗ Add a number of votes to the candidate’s ballot pile ·
∗
∗ This method cannot be called twice for the same candidate in the
∗ same round of counting ·
∗
∗ @param numberOfVotes
∗ Number of votes to add
∗ @param count
∗ The round of counting at which the votes were added
∗/
public normal_behavior
requires state == CONTINUING;
requires lastCountNumber < = count;
requires 0 < = count;
requires count < votesAdded ·length;
requires 0 < = numberOfVotes;
assignable lastCountNumber, votesAdded[count], totalVote;
ensures \old(votesAdded[count]) +
numberOfVotes == votesAdded[count];
ensures \old(totalVote) + numberOfVotes == totalVote;
ensures count == lastCountNumber;
public void addVote(final int numberOfVotes, final int count);
/∗ ∗
∗ Update the last count number for this Candidate
∗
∗ @param count
∗ The number of the most recent count
∗/
protected normal_behavior
requires count < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
requires count < votesAdded ·length;
requires count < votesRemoved ·length;
requires lastCountNumber < = count;
assignable lastCountNumber;
ensures lastCountNumber == count;
protected void updateCountNumber(final int count);
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/∗ ∗
∗ Removes a number of votes from a candidates ballot stack ·
∗
∗ This method cannot be called twice for the same candidate
∗ in the same round of counting ·
∗
∗ @param numberOfVotes
∗ Number of votes to remove from this candidate
∗ @param count
∗ The round of counting at which the votes were removed
∗/
public normal_behavior
requires state == ELIMINATED || state == ELECTED;
requires lastCountNumber < = count;
requires 0 < = count;
requires count < votesRemoved ·length;
requires count < votesAdded ·length;
requires count < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
requires 0 < = numberOfVotes;
requires numberOfVotes < = getTotalAtCount();
assignable lastCountNumber, votesRemoved[count], removedVote;
ensures \old(votesRemoved[count]) + numberOfVotes ==
votesRemoved[count];
ensures \old(removedVote) + numberOfVotes == removedVote;
ensures count == lastCountNumber;
public void removeVote(final int numberOfVotes, final int count);
/∗ ∗ Declares the candidate to be elected ∗/
public normal_behavior
requires this ·state == CONTINUING;
requires this ·lastCountNumber < = countNumber;
requires 0 < = countNumber &&
countNumber < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
requires countNumber < votesAdded ·length;
requires countNumber < votesRemoved ·length;
assignable state, lastCountNumber;
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ensures state == ELECTED;
public void declareElected(final int countNumber);
/∗ ∗ Declares the candidate to be eliminated ∗/
public normal_behavior
requires 0 < = countNumber &&
countNumber < CountConfiguration ·MAXCOUNT;
requires countNumber < votesAdded ·length;
requires countNumber < votesRemoved ·length;
requires this ·lastCountNumber < = countNumber;
requires this ·state == CONTINUING;
assignable state, lastCountNumber;
ensures state == ELIMINATED;
public void declareEliminated(final int countNumber);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determines the relative ordering of the candidate in the event of
∗ a tie ·
∗
∗ @param other
∗ The other candidate to compare with this candidate




(this ·candidateID > other ·candidateID);
public pure boolean isAfter(final non_null Candidate other);
/∗ ∗
∗ Is this the same candidate?
∗
∗ @param other
∗ The candidate to be compared
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if this is the same candidate
∗/
public normal_behavior
ensures \result == ((other #= null) &&
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(other ·candidateID == candidateID));
public model pure boolean sameAs (non_null Candidate other) {
return (other ·candidateID == this ·candidateID);
}
/∗ ∗
∗ How many votes have been received by this round of counting?
∗
∗ @return The total number of votes received so far
∗/
ensures \result == totalVote - removedVote;
public model pure int getTotalAtCount() {
return totalVote - removedVote;
}
/∗ ∗
∗ Has this candidate been elected?
∗
∗ @return < code> true< /code> if elected
∗/
ensures \result == (state == ELECTED);
public pure boolean isElected();
//@ ensures \result == (state == ELIMINATED);




public class Constituency {
public Constituency() {
this ·candidates = Candidate ·MAX_CANDIDATES;
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this ·totalSeatsInConstituency = 1;
this ·seatsInThisElection = 1;
this ·candidateList = null;
}
/∗ ∗ Number of candidates for election in this constituency ∗/
public invariant 0 < candidates;
public invariant seatsInThisElection < candidates;
public invariant candidates < = Candidate ·MAX_CANDIDATES;
protected spec_public int candidates;
/∗ ∗ Number of seats to be filled in this election ∗/
public invariant 0 < seatsInThisElection;
protected spec_public int seatsInThisElection;
/∗ ∗ Number of seats in this constituency ∗/
//@ public invariant seatsInThisElection < = totalSeatsInConstituency;
protected spec_public int totalSeatsInConstituency;
/∗ ∗ List of all candidates in this election ∗/
protected spec_public Candidate[] candidateList;
public ghost boolean candidateDataInUse = false;
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the < code> Candidate< /code> object ·
∗
∗ @return The candidate at that position on the initial list
∗/
requires \nonnullelements (candidateList);
requires 0 < = index && index < candidateList ·length;
ensures candidateList[index] == \result;
public pure non_null Candidate getCandidate(final int index);
/∗ ∗
∗ Determine the number of candidates in this election ·
∗
∗ @param number
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∗ The number of candidates in this election ·
∗ There must be at least two candidates or choices in any
∗ election ·
∗/
requires 2 < = number && number < = Candidate ·MAX_CANDIDATES;
requires seatsInThisElection < number;
requires candidateDataInUse == false;
assignable candidates, candidateList, candidateDataInUse,
candidateList[∗];
ensures number == this ·candidates;
ensures this ·candidates < = candidateList ·length;
ensures candidateDataInUse == true;
public void setNumberOfCandidates(final int number);
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the number of seats in this election
∗
∗ @return The number of seats for election
∗/
ensures \result == seatsInThisElection;
public pure int getNumberOfSeatsInThisElection();
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the total number of seats for a full general election
∗
∗ @return The total number of seats
∗/
ensures \result == totalSeatsInConstituency;
public/∗@ pure @∗/int getTotalNumberOfSeats();
requires seatsInElection < = seatsInConstituency;
requires 0 < seatsInElection;
requires seatsInElection < candidates;
assignable seatsInThisElection;
assignable totalSeatsInConstituency;
ensures seatsInThisElection == seatsInElection;
ensures totalSeatsInConstituency == seatsInConstituency;
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public void setNumberOfSeats(final int seatsInElection,
final int seatsInConstituency);
/∗ ∗
∗ Get the number of candidates running for election in this
∗ constituency ·
∗
∗ @return The number of candidates ·
∗/
ensures \result == this ·candidates;
public/∗@ pure @∗/int getNumberOfCandidates();
/∗ ∗
∗ Load the list of candidates for this constituency ·
∗
∗ @param candidateIDs
∗ The list of candidate identifiers corresponding to the
∗ encoding of the ballots
∗/
requires candidateDataInUse == false;
requires seatsInThisElection < candidateIDs ·length;
requires (\forall int i; 0 < = i && i < candidateIDs ·length;
0 < candidateIDs[i]);
assignable candidates, candidateList, candidateDataInUse,
candidateList[∗];
ensures \nonnullelements (candidateList);
ensures candidateDataInUse == true;
ensures candidateList ·length == candidateIDs ·length;
ensures candidates == candidateIDs ·length;




C.1 Signatures and Axioms
-- An individual person standing for election
sig Candidate {
votes: set Ballot,
-- First preference ballots received
transfers: set Ballot,
-- Second and subsequent preferences received
surplus: set Ballot,





0 < #wasted iff (
outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable or
outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable or
outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable)
no b:Ballot | b in votes & transfers
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all b: Ballot | b in votes + transfers implies
this in b ·assignees
surplus in votes + transfers and
Election ·method = Plurality
implies #surplus = 0
and #transfers = 0
0 < #transfers implies
Election ·method = STV
-- Losers excluded but above threshold
(outcome = EarlyLoser or
outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable) iff
(this in Scenario ·eliminated and
not (#votes + #transfers < Scenario ·threshold))
outcome = TiedLoser implies
Scenario ·threshold < = #votes + #transfers
outcome = Loser implies
Scenario ·threshold < = #votes + #transfers
outcome = EarlyLoser implies
Scenario ·threshold < = #votes + #transfers
outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable implies
Scenario ·threshold < = #votes + #transfers
Election ·method = Plurality implies
(outcome = Loser or
outcome = SoreLoser or
outcome = Winner or
outcome = TiedWinner or
outcome = TiedLoser or
outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
// PR-STV Winner has at least a quota of first preference
votes
(Election ·method = STV and outcome = Winner) implies
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Scenario ·quota = #votes
(outcome = SurplusWinner or outcome =
WinnerNonTransferable) implies
Scenario ·quota < #votes
// Quota Winner has a least a quota of votes after
transfers
outcome = QuotaWinner implies
Scenario ·quota = #votes + #transfers
(outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or outcome =
QuotaWinnerNonTransferable)
implies Scenario ·quota < #votes + #transfers
// Quota Winner does not have a quota of first preference
votes
(outcome = QuotaWinner or outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable) implies
not Scenario ·quota < = #votes
// Compromise winners do not have a quota of votes
outcome = CompromiseWinner implies
not (Scenario ·quota < = #votes + #transfers)
// STV Tied Winners have less than a quota of votes
(Election ·method = STV and outcome = TiedWinner) implies
not (Scenario ·quota < = #votes + #transfers)
// Sore Losers have less votes than the threshold
(outcome = SoreLoser or outcome =
EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable or
outcome = EarlySoreLoser or outcome =
EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable)
implies #votes + #transfers < Scenario ·threshold
// Tied Sore Losers have less votes than the threshold
outcome = TiedSoreLoser implies
#votes + #transfers < Scenario ·threshold
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// Size of surplus for each STV Winner and Quota Winner
(outcome = SurplusWinner or outcome =
WinnerNonTransferable)
implies ((#surplus = #votes - Scenario ·quota) and #
transfers = 0)
(outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or outcome =
QuotaWinnerNonTransferable)
implies (#surplus = #votes + #transfers - Scenario ·
quota)
(outcome = Winner and Election ·method = STV) implies
(Scenario ·quota + #surplus = #votes) and #transfers =
0
(outcome = QuotaWinner or outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable) implies surplus
in transfers
(outcome = QuotaWinner or outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable) implies
Scenario ·quota + #surplus = #votes + #transfers
// Existence of surplus ballots
0 < #surplus implies (outcome = SurplusWinner or
outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable)
}
-- A digital or paper artifact which accurately records the
intentions
-- of the voter
sig Ballot {
assignees: set Candidate, -- Candidates to which this
ballot has
-- been assigned
preferences: seq Candidate -- Ranking of candidates
} {
assignees in preferences ·elems
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not preferences ·hasDups
preferences ·first in assignees
Election ·method = Plurality implies #preferences < = 1
0 < = #preferences
// First preference
all c: Candidate | preferences ·first = c iff this in c ·
votes
// Second and subsequent preferences
all disj donor,receiver: Candidate |
(donor + receiver in assignees and
this in receiver ·transfers and this in donor ·surplus)
implies
(preferences ·idxOf[donor] < preferences ·idxOf[receiver
] and
receiver in preferences ·rest ·elems)
// All transfered ballots are associated with the last
candidate to
// receive the transfer
all disj c,d: Candidate | this in c ·transfers implies
c in assignees and
(d not in assignees or preferences ·idxOf[d] <
preferences ·idxOf[c])
// Transfers to next continuing candidate
all disj skipped, receiving: Candidate |
preferences ·idxOf[skipped] < preferences ·idxOf[
receiving] and
receiving in assignees and (not skipped in assignees)
implies
(skipped in Scenario ·eliminated or
skipped ·outcome = SurplusWinner or
skipped ·outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
skipped ·outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
skipped ·outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable or
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skipped ·outcome = Winner or
skipped ·outcome = QuotaWinner)
}
-- An election result




-- Candidate excluded before final count
threshold: Int, -- Deposit Saving Threshold
quota: Int, -- Quota for this election
fullQuota: Int -- Quota if all seats were vacant
} {
all c: Candidate | c in winners + losers
#winners = Election ·seats
no c: Candidate | c in losers & winners
0 < #losers
all w: Candidate | all l: Candidate |
l in losers and w in winners implies
(#l ·votes + #l ·transfers < = #w ·votes + #w ·transfers)
Election ·method = STV implies threshold = 1 + fullQuota ·
div[4]
eliminated in losers
// All PR-STV losers have less votes than the quota
all c: Candidate | (c in losers and Election ·method = STV
) implies
#c ·votes + #c ·transfers < quota
// Winners have more votes than all non-tied losers
all disj c,d: Candidate | c in winners and
(d ·outcome = SoreLoser or d ·outcome = EarlyLoser or
d ·outcome = Loser or
d ·outcome = EarlySoreLoser) implies
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(#d ·votes + #d ·transfers) < (#c ·votes + #c ·transfers
)
// Losers have less votes than all non-tied winners
all disj c,d: Candidate |
(c ·outcome = CompromiseWinner or c ·outcome =
QuotaWinner or
c ·outcome = Winner
or c ·outcome = SurplusWinner or c ·outcome =
AboveQuotaWinner or
c ·outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
c ·outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable) and
d in losers implies
#d ·votes + #d ·transfers < #c ·votes + #c ·transfers
// Lowest candidate is eliminated first
all disj c,d: Candidate | c in eliminated and d not in
eliminated
implies #c ·votes + #c ·transfers < = #d ·votes + #d ·
transfers
// Winning outcomes
all c: Candidate | c in winners iff
(c ·outcome = Winner or c ·outcome = QuotaWinner or
c ·outcome = CompromiseWinner or
c ·outcome = TiedWinner or c ·outcome = SurplusWinner or
c ·outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
c ·outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
c ·outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable)
// Loser outcomes
all c: Candidate | c in losers iff
(c ·outcome = Loser or c ·outcome = EarlyLoser or
c ·outcome = SoreLoser or
c ·outcome = TiedLoser or c ·outcome = EarlySoreLoser or
c ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser or
c ·outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable or
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c ·outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable)
// STV election quotas
Election ·method = STV implies quota = 1 +
BallotBox ·size ·div[Election ·seats+ 1] and
fullQuota = 1 + BallotBox ·size ·div[Election ·
constituencySeats + 1]
Election ·method = Plurality implies quota = 1 and
fullQuota = 1
// All ties involve equality between at least one winner
and at
// least one loser
all w: Candidate | some l: Candidate | w ·outcome =
TiedWinner and
(l ·outcome = TiedLoser or l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
implies
(#l ·votes + #l ·transfers = #w ·votes + #w ·transfers)
all s: Candidate | some w: Candidate | w ·outcome =
TiedWinner and
(s ·outcome = SoreLoser or s ·outcome = TiedLoser)
implies
(#s ·votes = #w ·votes) or
(#s ·votes + #s ·transfers = #w ·votes + #w ·transfers)
// When there is a tied sore loser then there are no non-
sore losers
no disj a,b: Candidate | a ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser and
(b ·outcome = TiedLoser or
b ·outcome=Loser or b ·outcome=EarlyLoser or
b ·outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable)
// For each Tied Winner there is a Tied Loser
all w: Candidate | some l: Candidate | w ·outcome =
TiedWinner implies
(l ·outcome = TiedLoser or l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
// Tied Winners and Tied Losers have an equal number of
votes
all disj l,w: Candidate |
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((l ·outcome = TiedLoser or l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
and
w ·outcome = TiedWinner) implies
#w ·votes + #w ·transfers = #l ·votes + #l ·transfers
// Compromise winner must have more votes than any tied
winners
all disj c,t: Candidate | (c ·outcome = CompromiseWinner
and
t ·outcome = TiedWinner) implies
#t ·votes + #t ·transfers < #c ·votes + #c ·transfers
// Winners have more votes than non-tied losers
all w,l: Candidate | w ·outcome = Winner and
(l ·outcome = Loser or l ·outcome = EarlyLoser or
l ·outcome = SoreLoser or
l ·outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable or
l ·outcome = EarlySoreLoser or
l ·outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable)
implies
((#l ·votes < #w ·votes) or
(#l ·votes + #l ·transfers < #w ·votes + #w ·transfers))
// For each Tied Loser there is at least one Tied Winner
all c: Candidate | some w: Candidate |
(c ·outcome = TiedLoser or c ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
implies w ·outcome = TiedWinner
}
-- The Ballot Box
one sig BallotBox {
spoiltBallots: set Ballot,
-- empty ballots excluded from count
nonTransferables: set Ballot,
-- ballots for which preferences are
-- exhausted/wasted votes
size: Int
-- number of unspolit ballots
}
{
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no b: Ballot | b in spoiltBallots and b in
nonTransferables
size = #Ballot - #spoiltBallots
all b: Ballot | b in spoiltBallots iff #b ·preferences = 0
// All non-transferable ballots belong to an non-
transferable surplus
all b: Ballot | some c: Candidate | b in nonTransferables
implies
b in c ·wasted
}
-- An Electoral Constituency
one sig Election {
seats: Int, -- number of seats to be filled
constituencySeats: Int, -- full number of seats









all c: Candidate | all b: Ballot | b in c ·votes + c ·
transfers
implies c in b ·assignees
}
check honestCount for 15 but 6 int
assert atLeastOneLoser {
0 < #Scenario ·losers
}
check atLeastOneLoser for 15 but 6 int
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assert atLeastOneWinner {
0 < #Scenario ·winners
}
check atLeastOneWinner for 14 but 6 int
assert plurality {
all c: Candidate | all b: Ballot | b in c ·votes and
Election ·method = Plurality implies c in b ·preferences ·
first
}
check plurality for 18 but 6 int
assert pluralityNoTransfers {
all c: Candidate | Election ·method = Plurality implies
0 = #c ·transfers
}
check pluralityNoTransfers for 13 but 7 int
assert wellFormedTieBreaker {
some w,l : Candidate | (w in Scenario ·winners and
l in Scenario ·losers and
#w ·votes = #l ·votes and #w ·transfers = #l ·transfers)
implies
w ·outcome = TiedWinner and
(l ·outcome = TiedLoser or l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser)
}
check wellFormedTieBreaker for 18 but 6 int
assert validSurplus {
all c: Candidate | 0 < #c ·surplus implies
(c ·outcome = WinnerNonTransferable or
c ·outcome = QuotaWinnerNonTransferable or
c ·outcome = SurplusWinner or
c ·outcome = AboveQuotaWinner or
c in Scenario ·eliminated)
}
162 APPENDIX C. ALLOY MODEL
check validSurplus for 16 but 6 int
-- Advanced Lemmas
-- Equal losers are tied or excluded early before last
round
assert equalityofTiedWinnersAndLosers {
all disj w,l: Candidate | w in Scenario ·winners and
l in Scenario ·losers and
#w ·votes + #w ·transfers = #l ·votes + #l ·transfers
implies
w ·outcome = TiedWinner and
(l ·outcome = TiedLoser or
l ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser or
l ·outcome = EarlyLoserNonTransferable or
l ·outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable or
l ·outcome = EarlyLoser)
}
check equalityofTiedWinnersAndLosers for 16 but 7 int
-- No lost votes during counting
assert accounting {
all b: Ballot | some c: Candidate | 0 < #b ·preferences
implies
b in c ·votes and c in b ·assignees
}
check accounting for 16 but 6 int
-- Cannot have tie breaker with losers both above and below
threshold
assert tiedWinnerLoserTiedSoreLoser {
no disj c,w,l: Candidate | c ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser and
w ·outcome = TiedWinner and (l ·outcome = Loser or
l ·outcome = TiedLoser)
}
check tiedWinnerLoserTiedSoreLoser for 6 int
-- Compromise winner must have at least one vote
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assert validCompromise {
all c: Candidate | c ·outcome = CompromiseWinner implies
0 < #c ·votes + #c ·transfers
}
check validCompromise for 6 int
-- Quota winner needs transfers
assert quotaWinnerNeedsTransfers {
all c: Candidate | c ·outcome = QuotaWinner implies
0 < #c ·transfers
}
check quotaWinnerNeedsTransfers for 7 int
-- Sore losers below threshold
assert soreLoserBelowThreshold {
all c: Candidate | c ·outcome = SoreLoser implies not
(Scenario ·threshold < = #c ·votes + #c ·transfers)
}
check soreLoserBelowThreshold for 10 but 6 int
-- Possible outcomes when under the threshold
assert underThresholdOutcomes {
all c: Candidate |
(#c ·votes + #c ·transfers < Scenario ·threshold)
implies
(c ·outcome = SoreLoser or
c ·outcome = TiedSoreLoser or
c ·outcome = TiedWinner or
c ·outcome = EarlySoreLoserNonTransferable or
c ·outcome = EarlySoreLoser or
c ·outcome = CompromiseWinner or
(Election ·method = Plurality and c ·outcome = Winner))
}
check underThresholdOutcomes for 10 but 6 int
-- Tied Winners have equality of votes and transfers
assert tiedWinnerEquality {
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all a,b: Candidate | (a ·outcome = TiedWinner and
b ·outcome = TiedWinner) implies
#a ·votes + #a ·transfers = #b ·votes + #b ·transfers
}
check tiedWinnerEquality for 10 but 6 int
-- Non-negative threshold and quota
assert nonNegativeThresholdAndQuota {
0 < = Scenario ·threshold and 0 < = Scenario ·quota
}
check nonNegativeThresholdAndQuota for 6 but 6 int
-- STV threshold below quota
assert thresholdBelowQuota {
Election ·method = STV and 0 < #Ballot implies
Scenario ·threshold < = Scenario ·quota
}
check thresholdBelowQuota for 13 but 7 int
-- Plurality sore loser
assert pluralitySoreLoser {
all c: Candidate | (c ·outcome = SoreLoser and
Election ·method = Plurality) implies
#c ·votes < Scenario ·threshold
}
check pluralitySoreLoser for 13 but 7 int
-- Plurality winner for a single seat constituency
assert pluralityWinner {
all disj a, b: Candidate |
(Election ·method = Plurality and
Election ·seats = 1 and
a ·outcome = Winner) implies
#b ·votes < = #a ·votes
}
check pluralityWinner for 2 but 7 int
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-- Length of PR-STV ballot does not
-- exceed number of candidates
assert lengthOfBallot {
all b: Ballot | Election ·method = STV implies
#b ·preferences < = #Candidate
}
check lengthOfBallot for 7 int
-- Quota for a full election is less than for a by-election
assert fullQuota {
Scenario ·fullQuota < = Scenario ·quota
}
check fullQuota for 7 int
-- All transfers have a source either from
-- a winner with surplus or by
-- early elimination of a loser
assert transfersHaveSource {
all b: Ballot | some disj donor, receiver : Candidate |
b in receiver ·transfers
implies b in donor ·votes and
(donor in Scenario ·winners or donor in Scenario ·
eliminated)
}
check transfersHaveSource for 7 int
-- No missing candidates
assert noMissingCandidates {
#Candidate = #Scenario ·winners + #Scenario ·losers
}
check noMissingCandidates for 7 int
-- Spoilt votes are not allocated to any candidate
assert handleSpoiltBallots {
no c : Candidate | some b : Ballot | b in c ·votes and
b in BallotBox ·spoiltBallots
}
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check handleSpoiltBallots for 7 int
-- The End
The End.
